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fla;.at~able li~u.i<( ( colt~rr.a.rl f'l..l.'~l) -w'.:c:!. ::!"!
apace. !'be. t'ireextenc.ad . to 10\oi burn.i.r~e

originated fn the vapors of i'l

..•.-a6 unaer the basement stL::.rwe.y e Wbl:ge

(

to the 2x4 bast: plate of the bssement st.o:rase l!lpaoo partition wall. '.L'h,;:. fire f'ur·t.har
extended to heavy charring to the under side of the basement at.air,;e.y, at.ep~..• F'\. ·J'th.::r
to througn and throughout the storage space. F\lrthor to burning UJ.l bet1.-een t;·,e O;.l;
wal i. s'tuCls of the pa.rti tion wall between thfJ basement anc th•3 first floc,r . l~trt.tM?r
to consurn.ing the t.r.e floor joist und.er the ki tchc:n floor • .Fur. ~.:.lc l~ to cc ::._a;:-~r · oq
f
. • the .d tc~en . troor. ,further t6 burning ano. hl:!avy c::r...arring to the underEaae o! tre
first floor,floor. The fire further extended up· between the 2x.~ wall stu::s of tc.e
partition wall of the stair-way leading to the aeoond floor, to the second floor
level ;resul tins -w 9ollapsing of the aecond floor sta.i~. l<'urther to burning up
between the 2x4 wctil st ... cis between the first and secona floor. Ji'urther to burning
. and h.:;avy charrine of the second floor linen and storage closet, loc:a.tea· ir.. ticH:
second fl0or common hallwa::; FUrther to high l:'..eat and smoke dam.<.ge throu..::;hot:.t the
en~ire dwelling. The f~e was there confined.
v.riters talKed to "ames •'Jotz W/M 41 13b26 Linnhurat 5214409
Ee said that he has understood that rey neighbor has had proble:.r. a wi tb severc.W.
juv....niles resicing in the area. l.!ue to the fact that he ie a police officer.
Last ~ric ~y Oct. 10 his wife returnea r~me to fino burning newap~pers thrown into
tht:.~r tc.sement. l uncierste.nd t:rJ.£:.t both the :police and 'the arson B-d,Uao. we:·a not.i t'l.eC. at
tr.e. t "time. ·r his .!<'rid.ay Oct. 17 the owner left at appromix.mately between:> w.:d 6 ?~t~.
with mezr:bers of his boy scout troop, also his wife and their two children to go up
north.
"""' 7 l
• •

•no C •f 0-811 ·1£ (bv. 11-79

- -·- '··.s
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h,:c 2 Fire at 136~~9 Linnhurst

'···--·--- -·-'-·

-- ..--- ..

on 10/18/80 0542

l further got a hold of t;he owner Ray Cliffo1·d and told him about the fire. hr.
cal } e~ ancl cc.lled his :i.n;JUro.nce agent ox.i'or'C.i tmd .ctano of St Cle.ir·e shoret> but r" was
ur.a.cle t.o get in ·to""ch with them. So he gave me the :phone number to call o.nd I tl ied
at' l~ast "' ho.lf c. ':1ozen tiir.es to no avail. l than called the St. Claire Shoree police.
I epo~e to & Sgt. ne.nms he sent a scout car to the agents house, who then callej rJ·w
IJOli ce who in turn called me. I spoke to a ClarenGe Imbrisione(phon.} who pror.·t.i sea to
send. out a boarcdng up
and a :.adjus tor·: I furtber .~ta1ke d to !'<lr."'Clifford by
v-fJ
. pho:-:e and t,ol c. hi:~;r g ot a hOl a o! bl s a gent. :Further .L told him about the r'ire ' \
aamo.0e. f-ir. Clifi,Pr\i told me that he would not be back because there is not.hin? l. J~v-'
co.n oo. ;·urtner ;he said that he was going fishing.
~riters talked to Esther Sear W/F 73 1)aj5 Linnhurst 372~4~57
She said that the people next door Etama and Ray il.Ufo:cd went up north to their
property near Alp ana. She further said they left their house about 4: )0 P .t<:. t.hey
had both of their chilaren with them. Also they took their camper. She further
:said :tb?Y left their dogs in the g&.r-!J(}e. F'urther that she was asleep on 10/1b;b0
and ti.o.t sh~ard the does-next door banging their bo~>;ls on the driveway. She L...rther
said that ste sta.yed in bed for about another half hour and at that time she sa ... a
tl)at she smelled smoke. She further said that she got up and looked ol.!t her side
wi .. 1do,. and saw srnoi:-:e co:r.:ing rrom the front porch of the Clifforda house. At th.i.s time shE
further saio that she callea 911 and about 5 min. later the fire aept. got there.
sr.e !urtr:.er said that tile l-lifford.s had another fire just a.boout a week b efore this one,
She said someone broke out the basement window and put Durning pi; pers into the basement.
She t'urther said that Mrs. Clifford is very nice she g~ve ua a srno::<.e detector abcut
a weeA before this fire, Jl.t the time she gave ua the smoke o~.. ecto:r she said ' 1 I' am
giving yo\..1 tl'lis smoke detector so you and Jack won'nt burn up •
4

crew

..., C oi0-&11-lE-A (b•. 11·701

lie said that he observed the side d.Oor be.1ng'1Uelte<1 l.n l."t. W& t.l.llW -r;.J·un, ll.t'el~gtl~erB
got water on the fire.He further said that ha WU told
1!.'!. O:f:f:l,.cer , tJ:u,.t~· the firofigh"t. .

oy•..

,.

,.I'
I

"·..;.

!" ·

0
.._

on the :front porch nGeded.h.elp with the 11 line. At this time we advanced the line
in the front door about 4 ft . when we notioed t.h&t the ballwa,y floor betheeo U1e l i viL
room tmd kitchen was ready to coll&p.se. l than b&cked out and notified "tM cr.ier of
the situation. When I reentered the house at that tj~e the fire waa fluing up the
6
side of t:le stairway. Further he aid that F.F. removed a
,
Writers talked to o ert Kinnee W -1
.Pollee o
oer "')f{a Pet. ba:!> en.C"nt.
He said that he was good friend of Ray Clifford and that they went to sohool together.
He further sa..;,.d that .iiay had another fir~ about 6 to 7 ya~.:re aso in a houae he 1.taa
living in.He furthor said that Ray's aaughter burned berael~· severly-in anotr.er fire.
He further said that he was not sure of the etreet but b.e said it could have been
Castleton or Castle or maybe l,..yca.ste, but it was near 'the City ..til"pprt. He :further aaj .
That nay and his wife went up to their property in Presque Iele Harbor. Ho further sai ~
that he called hay at'ter the fire and ray was not that upset about it. Hs said that
Ray told him that tb.ec'e was 'nt a.nyt.b.ing he could do. So be was going to atay \ZP
n orth and go fish.ing. Further ll. 0 .. Kinnee said that R8.! had a selec-cavision
on top !lis T.V . in the livingroorn, but it is missi
now
.
nspection of the scene revealed 2-~ story brick and frame d~lling wn.ieh ,was~
1n good conai tion prior to the fire. 'Writers noted· a can of coleman by tne aio.e ~
door of the owelling. loiriters further viewed the fire o.amage. Writara nct.ed the
point of origin which ~as under the basement stairway. At ~e ~int of ori~in writ~ru
noted a strong odor of a flammable liquid. Also :found at tne po~nt of Ol'i&l-~ were
1
two coleman fuel oil cans. Which were placed on Ev~dence TagSif 8o0441 a.nd 8oo4 lt ·•
l>-41 ·lf·A {lov. 11-70)

-~----- · ---

- -· ---··-------··-- ---·--·- ·----·
l'age 4 Pire at 13829 Linnhurst on 10/18/00

___________ _______ ---,

of cole

which
a s ow cooker from unoer
the stairway storage space ana placed it on ~Vidence tagff8o0443 ~ritera further dug
t~ough the fire debris and located a electioal appliance cord which was running
unaer the basement carpeting from the storage space, to behin(i the laundry room
door. writers looke~ behind the laundryroom door next to the hot waterbeat a."ld
aw a Z!f hour appUa.nce timer, which was pluged in to the outleton ,_the south of ·~:-le
basement recreat~onroom. Writers compared the appliance cord with the cord on
the slow copfer . Writers noted that both ends of the cord looked the eame. ;~so
tne slow oooker and the cord were both shorted out and the ends of the wires were
alled. u.'ri'ttrs recovered the Appliance timer and laced it on evidence t~sf 8o0445 ·
Writers also requested Dept. photoc:;rapher Greenway to responae.:::t to the soeneana '
t;Ke oyer aJJ photo's of the scene. Writers further noted that ~e closets and
2E~ssera in ~he ~pstairs bedroom contained qlder clothing and older sbpes. Further
wr1 ters coula not l ocate Nr. CHffords b<:1dge or uniform · cap. 'w'ri tera did locate
a.mr:1urli tion for a 30- )0 rifle and ammunition for 30-06 rifle, but writers didnot
locate the rifles. Writers received information from that scout car 15-7 recovered
a 30-30 rifle from the fire scene and placed it on evidenco tagff243259· Writers
also t~ted tc locate selectavision video tape mao~tne which was reported to be in
the livingroom. ~"riters noted wiring behind the T. V. which was coiled u.9 e.nd numours
P aceo o

•

..... .
•~o,

a&

• wri tera also recovere

videotape cassettes 0~- th~ b~ok-case but writers were {i'uable to locate the videotape
machine. <'~ri tera noted nails i n the diningroom, which appeared to bo us.sd to hang
pictures, but no pictures were found.
check of the front and rear and side aoors
revealed that the locks were, in the locked position at tho time of the fire .
\ Writers were also i~ormed by F.F . Carter that fire fiehters forced entry ~ the
o1~1:~. 1 1.101 dwelhna •
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writers also noted 1n 'the upstairs be~ om a digital clock which had stprf ed at
4 1 15 A.M. the cloak was located in the secor~d floor southwest bedroom.
,
W'ri ters view tht ~-erto::of the dwelling and noted that t hor e wns no eoo~ng on t he
f the dwelling 'Wb.:i.ch would indic .. te that t,.lj.e windows and ooors were intact.
.
ex t enor o
.
.
before 'ciieoovery of the fire. W'ri ters also noted fi"· h.e !iv}>' ooncent ro.tion of d;.;..r-k
) brown syrupy s tains on t.he light bulbs and . gl& &a- throughout t ha dwe lling) ln.:U catir.,g
1 tte fire burned for a considerable length of time prior to di eooverY• wr i ter s
noted t.ha.t. the timer tha t was founo behind the launo.ry £·oom door was s et to go on
.( at 3;4j a.m. and to "tUr1n of.:f at ~:00 a.m.
In view of the above investigation it is the opinion ot the writerB that this fire
was incendiary in nature and set by unknown ;versone for the mo ti v 0 of f!'~'..!~... 'I':!! s
investigation to be o~tinuea with interview of ~~on~et~
,

.
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10/19/82
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-357

(Oct. 29 Conference)

~~~~
You asked for my views on whether this is a good case in
which

to consider

exclusionary rule.

recognizing

a

"good

faith"

exception to the

My answer is "no."

----

The result in this case seems absurd.

---.

I tend to agree with

the concurring judge that there is an attenuated expectation of
privacy in this "burned and gutted building which was accumulater and which was open
this view did not prevail
tice Rehnquist,

t ~; assers."

i~

(Pet. at 16.)

~t

With the exception of Jus-

all agreed that a warrant is required to search

such a building after the fire is over.
Even pursuant to Tyler the result here may be questioned.
Had these investigators arrived on the scene and entered after
the basement was pumped out, their entry arguably would have been
permissible under Tyler's holding that "officials need no warrant
to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the

-\

cause of a

blaze

510.

a

Thus

after it has been extinguished."

different

-

result

-

436

U.S at

obtained here primarily because

-

"the arson investigators did not arrive while the fire was being

--

put out. "

(Pet. at 15 (lower court opinion).)

Since there is no hint that the arson investigators deliberately violated the owners'

4th Amendment rights, a case can be

made for a "good faith" exception here.

But there are two prob-

I

2.
lems.
for

other reason

their failure to obtain a warrant.

tion,

According to the peti-

the firefighters reported that the fire was of suspicious

origin.

The

investigators arrived

six hours

later.

This was

sufficient time in which to obtain a warrant.
Second, and more significant, the investigators entered the
'
,,
building pursuant to a Detroit Fire Department policy that "per\

mits an investigator to enter a burned dwelling without a warrant
if the owner is not present and the dwelling is deemed open to
trespass."

(Pet. at 12.)

pol icy could have been a

Although at one time adherence to this
"good faith"

mistake,

after Tyler --

decided two years prior to the entry here -- the policy unques-

______

The point of a "good faith" exception is ..__
to permit the______,_intraduction of evidence where exclusion would not promote the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule.
nois,

422

u.s.

590,

609-10

(1975)

(Powell,

See Brown v.
J.,

Illi-

concurring

in

part) •
premise that a warrant should have been obtained and given that
the officers had no good reason not to do so.
evidence may

impel

Exclusion of this

the Detroit Fire Department to conform its

policy to Tyler and to instruct investigators to seek warrants
when conducting investigations that are "detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry."
Therefore,

although I

Tyler, 436

u.s.

at 511.

agree wholeheartedly that the result

in this case creates disrespect for the law,

I think the "good

faith" exception issue should be reserved for a better case.
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October 29, 1982 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
No. 8 2-357

~ ~ • t:2--

MICHIGAN

Cert to Mich. • ~y::~J
Ct. App.
/~"r
(Cynar, Riley
& Kelly,

v.

Ti etf

'

"'

concurring~
~curiam)

State/Criminal
1.

SUMMARY:

(1)

'-z-!r

Whether an arson squad investigator may

enter a burned dwelling six hours after a fire is extinguished
without obtaining a search

warrant~

and (2) if the entry was

improper, whether the illegal entry was a "but for" cause of the
discovery of the items seized.
2.

FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

Early one morning, a fire broke

out at resps' home, while resps were out of town.

~~ M.V\

·.

Fire fighters

-2-

arrived on the scene within minutes, and, by 7:04a.m., the fire
was extinguished and the fire units

departed. ~

Later that same day, at about 1:00 p.m., arson investigators
'------.

arrived for the first time at resps' home.

The investigators did

not enter the home until 1:30 p.m., because they had to wait
until water was pumped out of the basement by agents of resps'
insurance company.

After the water was pumped out, the

v

investigators entered the home without a warrant, based upon the
arson squad's policy which permits an investigator to enter a
burned dwelling without a warrant if the owner is not present and
the dwelling is deemed open to trespass.

As a result of their

vl~arrantless search of the basement, the investigator ~seized
three empty cans of fuel, an electric crock pot, and a timer with
a cord attached.
The TC denied resps' motion to suppress this evidence on the
basis that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry.
The Mich. Ct. App. reversed.

~Michigan

u.s.

v. Tyler, 436

The Ct. App. found that, under
499 (1978), the arson squad's policy

was unconstitutional, and that the evidence therefore had to be
suppressed.
In Tyler, this Court held that, although no warrant is
needed in order for fire fighters to enter a home to fight a
blaze or to remain in the burned building for a reasonable time
~

to investigate after the blaze has been extinguished, a warrant

-----

--

is required for subsequent, nonconsensual reentries that are
"clearly detached from the initial exigency and warrantless
entry."

Id. at 511.

The Ct. App. found that Tyler dictated

-3-

suppression in this case, because the investigators did not
arrive until six hours after the fire was extinguished.

They did

not enter the premises for the purpose of ensuring that the blaze
would not rekindle or to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence.
Judge Kelly filed a concurring opinion.

He agreed with the

majority that the circumstances were not "exigent," and that
Tyler therefore compelled suppression.

However, he encouraged

the state to take this issue further in the appellate process,
because the Tyler holding is "ludicrous."
expectation

He queried:

"What

the owners, who were away on a

camping trip, have of a burned and gutted building which was
accumulating water and which was open to trespassers?"
The Mich. Sup. Ct. subsequently denied the state's
application for leave to appeal.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

One justice dissented.

The state argues that Tyler allows arson

investigators to enter a burned building without warrant
"promptly" after a fire is extinguished in order to determine its
origin.
-~

The question is one of reasonableness.

investigators entered as soon as possible.

The

Indeed, when they

arrived, they still had to wait before investigating until the
water was pumped out of the basement.
The state also contends that the exclusionary rule should
not be mechanically applied in situations where the police

v

.
.
. goo d f a1th
.
con d uct, even 1f
1mproper,
was 1n
and was not a "b ut

for" cause of the discovery of the items seized.

"Since it

cannot be said that the evidence would not have been discovered

-4but for the allegedly improper entry, the evidence should not be
suppressed."
4.

DISCUSSION:

Unless the Court wishes to reconsider the

"ludicrous" Tyler decision, cert should be denied.

This case

turns simply on a fact-bound finding that the investigators'
entry was "clearly detached from the initial exigency and
warrantless entry."

The state's conclusory contention that the

warrantless search was not a "but for" cause of the discovery of
the evidence seems meritless, and, in any event, there is no
indication that this issue was raised below.
I recommend denial.
There is no response.
October 8, 1982
ME

D'Zurilla

Opinion in Petition
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Justice Rehnquist

Circulated:

~~~

~~ ~ '

c

Recirculated: _ _J_A_
N_

4_ 19_8_3__

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MICHIGAN v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD AND
EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD

JuSTICE REHNQUIST dissenting from denial of certiorari. ~ ./.l.A:)
The respondents in this case, Raymond and Emma Jean
Clifford, were charged with wilfully and maliciously burning ~
a dwelling house and the contents thereof in violation of MCL
'
750. 72; MSA 28.267. They moved to suppress certain government evidence on the grounds that it was the fruit of an
unconstitutional warrantless search of their home by state arson investigators. The trial judge denied the motion and respondents took an interlocutory appeal to the Michigan Court
of Appeal. That court reversed the trial court, holding that
our decision in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), required a conclusion that'the arson investigators' search viola~ent to the Uimea"States Constitution and that the fruits of the search had to be suppressed.
Pet. at 11. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Pet. at 18, and the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, presenting, among others, the question whether "an arson squad investigator [may] enter a burned dwelling to
investigate the cause of a fire at the earliest time possible
after the flames are extinguished without obtaining a search
warrant?" Because I think that the decision below rests on
an artificial and illogical restriction that hinders important
state investigative efforts I would grant certiorari to clarify
our holding in Michigan v. Tyler, supra.

l\~
~

I
On October 18, 1980, at about 5:45a.m., a fire broke out at
the Cliffords' home in Detroit, Michigan. At the time the
Cliffords were out of the city. Fire units arrived at the
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scene within minutes of the alarm but the flames were not
extinguished until shortly after 7:00a.m. While attempting
to put out the blaze firefighters encountered evidence that
the fire had been deliberately set; owing to their lack of training in such matters the firefighters did not disturb the evidence, but instead notified members of the Detroit
Police/Fire Arson Squad of their suspicions. Later the same
day, at about 1:00 p.m., Lt. John Beyer, an arson investigator, and a partner arrived at respondents' home. At the
time unidentified persons-presumably agents of respondents' insurance company-were engaged in pumping water
out of the basement of the dwelling. Lt. Beyer waited until
this task was completed and then entered the basement. He
had not obtained a warrant to search the remains of the
structure. During his investigation he discovered three
empty fuel containers, an electric crock pot, and a timer with
a cord attached.
As noted above, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
Beyer's warrantless search of respondents' basement was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and suppressed the evidence obtained during the search. The court relied exclusively on our decision in Michigan v. Tyler, supra.
In Tyler a fire had broken out at a furniture store at 12:00
a.m.; the Fire Chief, charged with investigating the causes of
fires, did not arrive until2:00 a.m., when the blaze had been
all but extinguished. He was informed that firefighters had
encountered evidence of arson, and briefly entered the
smoke-filled building. The Chief then called a Police Detective, who arrived at 3:30a.m. Because of smoke and steam
within the store the two abandoned their investigation and
left the scene.
Six hours after his initial arrival at the scene, the Fire
Chief returned, accompanied by an Assistant Fire Chief, and
again briefly examined the building before leaving. An hour
later, at 9:00 a.m., the Assistant Fire Chief and the Police
Detective returned once more and thoroughly searched the
building, discovering considerable evidence of arson that had
been overlooked earlier. Finally, almost one month later, a
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different police officer returned and reexamined the building.
None of the entries was made pursuant to a warrant. 436
U. S., at 501-503.
The Court, in a badly split decision, upheld the constitutionality of all but the final search-that which had occurred
several weeks after the fire. It rejected, as "unrealistically
narrow," id., at 510, the lower court's conclusion that once
the last flame at a fire has been doused firefighters must
abandon the structure. Instead the Court noted that fire departments are "charged not only with extinguishing fires, but
with finding their causes." Ibid. It continued:
"Prompt determination of the fire's origin may be necessary to prevent its recurrence, as through the detection of continuing dangers such as faulty wiring or a defective furnace. Immediate investigation may also be
necessary to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction. And, of course, the sooner the officials complete their duties, the less will be their subsequent interference with the privacy and the recovery
efforts of the victims. For these reasons, officials need
no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time
to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished. And if the warrantless entry to put out the
fire and determine its cause is constitutional, the warrantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the
premises for these purposes also is constitutional."
Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that, under this standard, the first warrantless "searches" of the firefighters and the somewhat later
search by the Fire Chief were plainly lawful, apparently because the officials had merely "remain[ed] in [the] building
for a reasonable time" after concluding their firefighting efforts. I d., at 509.
Despite the fact that most of the later entries by fire and
police officials on the day of the fire were detached from these
initial entries, the Court held them constitutional. Thus, the
majority approved the entry, at 3:30a.m., of the Police De-
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tective and the subsequent entries of the Assistant Fire
Chief and the Police Detective, at 8:00 and 9:00a.m. These
results were justified on the grounds that the later entries
"were no more than an actual continuation of the first"
search. ld., at 511 (emphasis added). The entries occurring in the weeks after the day of the fire were held unconstitutional, however, on the ground that they were "clearly
detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry."
Ibid.
Interpreting this language, the Michigan Court of Appeals
decided that the arson investigators' warrantless entry into
respondents' former home was unconstitutional. The investigators were not viewed as having "remained" in the structure, nor was their search an "actual continuation" of the
firefighters' entry. The court relied on the facts that the investigators did not arrive on the scene until six hours after
the fire was extinguished, that they were not involved in
firefighting efforts and that they had time to obtain a warrant
for entering the structure.
II

The correctness of the Michigan court's application of
Michigan v. Tyler to the facts of this case is by no means free
from doubt. Plainly the ability of arson investigators to
have obtained a warrant should be irrelevant under our decisions; in Michigan v. Tyler the 8:00 and 9:00a.m. entries, occurring six and seven hours after the blaze was controlled,
could easily have been made pursuant to a warrant. Likewise, the mere elapse of time does not serve to distinguish
the cases, since the time elapsed between the controlling of
the fire and the later investigations was greater in Tyler than
here. Similarly, the fact that the arson investigators happened not to have participated in quelling the fire at respondents' home is of no consequence: in Tyler neither the Assistant Fire Chief nor the Police Detective played any part in the
firefighting effort. In any event, it would be anomalous for
the constitutionality of arson investigations to turn on the

l
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question whether the investigator also happended to be a
firefighter.
Indeed, it is difficult to draw any distinctions of consequence between the cases. In both instances, after an initial, cursory investigation by firefighters had aroused suspicions trained investigators were notified. In each case the
investigators arrived at the scene well after flames were
extinguished, and further delayed their examination owing to
the immediate aftermath of the blaze-the presence of smoke
and steam in Tyler, and in this case, the fact the basement
was filled with a foot of water. In short, if the subsequent
searches in Tyler were an "actual continuation" of the initial
entry for firefighting purposes, it is difficult to see why the
subsequent entries in this case do not fit within the same
category.
While the Michigan court's application of the rule set forth
in Tyler may be faulted, the more fundamental difficulty lies
in the Tyler opinion itself. First, the holding of the opinion
is not altogether consistent with its results. Its concluding
paragraph states that "In summation, we hold that an entry
to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries ... must be made pursuant [to a warrant]." I d., at 511
(emphasis added). Despite this, the Tyler Court approved
several searches conducted by persons unrelated to the
firefighting effort long after the building had been emptied;
plainly, the officials-who had never before set foot in the
structure-had not "remained" there, much less remained
there for a reasonable time.
Second, and more troubling, the decision sets forth a
rather vague exception to the "remain for a reasonable time"
standard; the standard is neither capable of clear application
nor supported by the rationale of the decision. Even if
firefighters abandon a structure, and different fire investigators return only hours later, their search may be upheld, provided that it is the "actual continuation" of the firefighters'

6
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first entry. Tyler does not, however, indicate what factors
influence the determination that an "actual continuation" has
occurred. Apparently the fact that different personnel are
involved, that a considerable period of time has elapsed and
so forth are of little importance; were this not the case, then
the subsequent searches in Tyler would not have been approved. Drawing the line between an "actual continuation"
and a "clearly detached" search is plainly difficult for judges,
not to mention fire department investigators, and the fact
that the Michigan Court of Appeals struck down a search that
was factually identical to that upheld in Tyler gives some indication of the inherent ambiguity of the "actual continuation" standard. I would grant certiorari to clarify the circumstances under which arson investigators may make
warrantless entries into fire-damaged buildings.
Finally, the reasoning of Tyler fails to support the standard articulated by the majority. Persons owning or inhabiting fire-damaged buildings undeniably have considerably reduced privacy expectations.
Such persons-unlike
occupants in ordinary times-expect, and welcome, the intrusions of fire, police, and medical officials in the period
following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers such
as insurance agents will frequently have authority to enter
the structure. Such considerations are particularly applicable where, as here, a structure is open to trespass, fire
damage is unrepaired, and the cleanup of the firefighting efforts continues. Moreover, powerful justifications for entry
are present in the period prior to cleanup and a commencement of repairs; it is in this time that clues to the fire's origins
may still remain. As the Tyler majority noted, "Immediate
investigation may . . . be necessary to preserve evidence
from intentional or accidental destruction [in the imminent
cleanup and repair activities]. And, of course, the sooner
the officials complete their duties, the less will be their subsequent interference with the privacy and the recovery efforts
ofthe victims." !d., at 510. These considerations justify, in
my view, warrantless searches made by arson investigators
so long as the structure has not yet been secured against
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trespass, or, so long as general repairs of the structure have
not yet commenced.
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No. 82-357.

Decided January-, 1983

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN
joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
The respondents in this case, Raymond and Emma Jean
Clifford, were charged with wilfully and maliciously burning
a d!Yelling house and the contents thereofill violabon ofMCL
750. 72; MSA 28.267. They moved to suppress certain government evidence on the grounds that it was the fruit of an
unconstitutional warrantless search of their home by state arson investigators.
· 'udge denied the motion andrespondents
an interlocutory a
1to the Michigan Court
of Appe . That court reversed the ial court,_holding that
our dec sion in Michigan v. Tyler
6 U. S. 499 (1978), reqmre a onclusion that th
on investigators' search violated the o
en ment to the United States Constitution and that the fruits of the search had to be suppressed.
Pet. at 11. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Pet. at 18, and the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, presenting, among others, the question whether "an arson squad investigator [may] enter a burned dwelling to
investigate the cause of a fire at the earliest time possible
after the flames are extinguished without obtaining a search
warr ?"
·
at the decisi
s s on
an rtificial and illogical restriction at hinders important
' state mves a 1ve e orts wou gr:ant certiorari to clarify
our holding in Michigan v. Tyler, supra.
I
On October 18, 1980, at about 5:45a.m., a fire broke out at
the Cliffords' home in Detroit, Michigan. At the time the
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Cliffords were out of the city. Fire units arrived at the
\ ~ "1
scene within minutes of the alarm but the flames were not
~Y ·
extinguished until shortly after 7:00 a.m. While attempting
'h/ 'l('r"
to put out the blaze firefighters encountered evidence that·1
the fire had been deliberately set; owing to their lack of train- • \t"
ing in such matters the firefighters did not disturb the evidence, but instead notified members of the Detroit
""' ~
Police/Fire Arson Squad of their suspicions. Later the same
if..,.. day, at about 1:00 p.m., Lt. John Beyer, an arson investiga, J::}) JY oJt,.p
tor, and a partner arrived at respondents' home. At the
~./ u-/'
time unidentified persons-presumably agents of respond- /
~A
ents' insurance company-were engaged in pumping water
out of the basement of the dwelling. Lt. Beyer waited until
this task was completed and then entered the basement. He
had not obtained a warrant to search the remains of the
structure. During his investigation he discovered three
empty fuel containers, an electric crock pot, and a timer with
a cord attached.
As noted above, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
Beyer's warrantless search of respondents' basement was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and suppressed the evidence obtained during the search. The court relied exclusi~ on our decision in Michigan v. 'l'yler, s'igJra.
In Tyler a fire had broken out at a furniture store at 12:00
a.m.; the Fire Chief, charged with investigating the causes of
fires , did not arrive until2:00 a.m. , when the blaze had been
all but extinguished. He was informed that firefighters had
encountered evidence of arson, and briefly entered the
smoke-filled building. The Chief then called a Police Detective, who arrived at 3:30a.m. Because of smoke and steam
within the store the two abandoned their investigation and
left the scene.
Six hours after his initial arrival at the scene, the Fire
Chief returned, accompanied by an Assistant Fire Chief, and
again briefly examined the building before leaving. An hour
later, at 9:00 a.m. , the Assistant Fire Chief and the Police
Detective returned once more and thoroughly searched the
building, discovering considerable evidence of arson that had

<
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been overlooked earlier. Finally, almost one month later, a
different police officer returned and reexamined the building.
None of the entries was made pursuant to a warrant. 436
U. S., at 501-503.
The Court, in a badly split decision, upheld the constitutionality of all but the final search-that which had occurred
several weeks after the fire. It rejected, as "unrealistically
narrow," id., at 510, the lower court's conclusion that once
the last flame at a fire has been doused firefighters must
abandon the structure. Instead the Court noted that fire departments are "charged not only with extinguishing fires, but
with finding their causes." Ibid. It continued:
"Prompt determination of the fire's origin may be necessary to prevent its recurrence, as through the detection of continuing dangers such as faulty wiring or a defective furnace. Immediate investigation may also be
necessary to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction. And, of course, the sooner the officials complete their duties, the less will be their subsequent interference with the privacy and the recovery
efforts of the victims. For these reasons, officials need
no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time
to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished. And if the warrantless entry to put out the
fire and determine its cause is constitutional, the warrantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the
premises for these purposes also is constitutional."
Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that, under this standard, the first warrantless "searches" of the firefighters and the somewhat later
search by the Fire Chief were plainly lawful, apparently because the officials had merely "remain[ed] in [the] building
for a reasonable time" after concluding their firefighting efforts. Id., at 509.
Despite the fact that most of the l;:~.ter entries by fire and
police officials on the day of the fire were detached from these
initial entries, the Court held them constitutional. Thus, the
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majority approved the entry, at 3:30a.m., of the Police Detective and the subsequent entries of the Assistant Fire
Chief and the Police Detective, at 8:00 and 9:00a.m. These
results were justified on the grounds that the later entries
"were no more than an actual continuation of the first"
search. ld., at 511 (emphasis added). The entries occurring in the weeks after the day of the fire were held unconstitutional, however, on the ground that they were "clearly
detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry."
Ibid.
Interpreting this language, the Michigan Court of Appeals
decided that the arson investigators' warrantless entry into
respondents' former home was unconstitutional. The investigators were not viewed as having "remained" in the structure, nor was their search an "actual continuation" of the
firefighters' entry. The court relied on the facts that the investigators did not arrive on the scene until six hours after
the fire was extinguished, that they were not involved in
firefighting efforts and that they had time to obtain a warrant
for entering the structure.
II
The correctness of the Michigan court's application of
Michigan v. Tyler to the facts of this case is by no means free
from doubt. Plainly the ability of arson investigators to
have obtained a warrant should be irrelevant under our decisions; in Michigan v. Tyler the 8:00 and 9:00a.m. entries, oc- t)r .1. .:: ...
curring six and seven hours after the blaze wa controlled
could easily have been made pursuant to a warrant. Likewise, the mere elapse of time does not serve to distinguish "
the cases, since the time elapsed between the controlling of
the fire and the later investigations was greater in Tyler than
here. Similarly, the fact that the arson investigators happened not to have participated in quelling the fire at respondents' home is of no consequence: in Tyler neither the Assistant Fire Chief nor the Police Detective played any part in the
firefighting effort. In any event, it would be anomalous for
the constitutionality of arson investigations to turn on the

"'" ' \
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question whether the investigator also happended to be a
firefighter.
Indeed, it is difficult to draw any distinctions of consequence between the cases. In both instances, after an initial, cursory investigation by firefighters had aroused suspicions trained investigators were notified. In each case the
investigators arrived at the scene well after flames were
extinguished, and further delayed their examination owing to
the immediate aftermath of the blaze-the presence of smoke
and steam in Tyler, and in this case, the fact the basement
was filled with a foot of water. In short, if the subsequent
searches in Tyler were an "actual continuation" of the initial
entry for firefighting purposes, it is difficult to see why the
subsequent entries in this case do not fit within the same
category.
While the Michigan court's application of the rule set forth
in Tyler may be faulted, the more fundamental difficulty lies
in the Tyler opinion itself. First, the holding of the opinion
is not altogether consistent with its results. Its concluding
paragraph states that "In summation, we hold that an entry
to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries . . . must be made pursuant [to a warrant]." I d. , at 511
(emphasis added). Despite this, the Tyler Court approved
several searches conducted by persons unrelated to the .
10
firefighting effort !9.~ a~ th.~Jmilding had been emptied; ~
plainly, the officials-wlio~n~before set foot in the .•
structure-had not "remained" there, much less remained ~
there for a reasonable time.
Second, and more troubling, the decision sets forth a
rather vague exception to the "remain for a reasonable time"
standard; the standard is neither capable of clear application
nor supported by the rationale of the decision. Even if
firefighters abandon a structure, and different fire investigators return only hours later, their search may be upheld, provided that it is the "actual continuation" of the firefighters'
first entry. Tyler does not, however, indicate what factors

ro
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influence the determination that an "actual continuation" has
occurred. Apparently the fact that different personnel are
involved, that a considerable period of time has elapsed and
so forth are of little importance; were this not the case, then
the subsequent searches in Tyler would not have been approved. Drawing the line between an "actual continuation"
and a "clearl detacned" search 1s plainly di(_ficult for judges,
nor o mention fire depa ment mvestigators, and the fact
that the Michigan Court of Appeals struck down a search that
was factually identical to that upheld in Tyler gives some indication of the inherent ambiguity of the "actual continuation" standard. I ~ould grant certiorari to clarify the circumstances under which arson investigators may make
warrantless entries into fire-damaged buildings.
Finally, the reasoning of Tyler fails to support the standard articulated by the majority. Persons owning or inhabiting fire-damaged buildings undeniably have considerably reduced privacy expectations.
Such persons-unlike
occupants in ordinary times-expect, and welcome, the intruWc.-1:.'~ Jt.,
sions of fire, police, and medical officials in the period r. uJ)
~ 0 ~.o-1 ,
following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers such ]~ J_a;.-~
as insurance agents will frequently have authority to enter (
;
v- C ~
the structure. Such considerations are particularly appli- c ~ c;J"" ~
cable where, as here, a structure is open to trespass, fire ~ , 1
damage is unrepaired, and the cleanup of the firefighting eflo fl..l"forts continues. Moreover, powerful justifications for entry
are present in the period prior to cleanup and a commencement of repairs; it is in this time that clues to the fire's origins
may still remain. As the Tyler majority noted, "Immediate
investigation may . . . be necessary to preserve evidence
from intentional or accidental destruction [in the imminent
cleanup and repair activities]. And, of course, the sooner
the officials complete their duties, the less will be their subsequent interference with the privacy and the recovery efforts
f the victims." Id., at 510. These considerations justify, in
view, warrantless searches made by arson investigators
long as t e structure has not yet been secured against
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trespass, or, so long as general repairs of the structure have
ot yet commenced.
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April 29, 1983 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4

Motion of Respondents to vacate Writ
of Certiorari as Improvidently Granted

No. 82-357
NICHIGAN

CLIFFORD

SUMMARY:

Resps argue that the second issue presented in this case was

never addressed below.
~
that issue.
FACTS:

Therefore, they move to vacate the writ of cert as to

Following a fire in resps' horne, arson investigators entered the

dwelling and seized incriminating evidence without first obtaining a warrant.
Applying the exigent circumstances exception, the trial court allowed
introduction of the · seized evidence.
Michigan v. TYler, 436

u.s.

The Mich. ct. App. reversed, citing

499 (1978).

Here, the court said, investigators

did not enter the house until six hours after the fire was put out.
The Mich. S.ct. denied petr's leave to appeal.

Petr thereafter filed its

'2.)

I.

II.

•May an arson squad investigator enter a burned dwelling to investigate the cause of a fire at the earliest
time possible after the flames are extinguished without obtaining a search warrant?•
•should the exclusionary rule be applied in a situation
where the JX>lice conduct, even if viewed as inproper,
was taken in good faith and was not a 'but for' cause
for the discovery of the items seized?•

CONTENTIONS:

Resp contends that the record clearly establishes that the

•good faith• issue, presented in question 2, was never raised in the state
trial or appellate courts.
issue.

The record below contains no reference to that

And petr's brief before the Mich. Ct. App. also fails to raise the

issue.
Resps assert that they missed the petr's interjection of a new issue
because it was •disingenuously• added to language of the second question (the
•but for• issue) which had been raised for the first time in the Mich. Ct. App.
Insertion of the words •good faith• creates an entirely new issue and in
effect expands the •but for• issue which was never properly raised in the
trial court.

Accordingly to resps, the Mich. Ct. App. implicitly declined to

address the •but for• issue because it was not raised in the trial court.
Failure to present a federal question in conformance with state procedure
provides an adequate and independent ground for denying review.

Henry v.

Miss., 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965).
Resps emphasize that the only issue raised by petr in the trial court was
question number one--the exigent circumstances issue.

That was also the issue

relied upon by the .Mich. Ct. App. in its decision.
Resps also point out that the petr's merits brief departs substantially
from points raised in the courts below.

Petr now concedes that given Mich. v.

Tyler, supra, the Mich. ct. App. decision was inevitable.

For the first time,

petr now urges reversal of an entire line of cases--including Mich. v. Tyler.

DISCUSSION:
re~s'

From the information available to the Court, it appears that

arguments have merit.

By adding the words "good faith" in the second

question, petr has apparently tried to take advantage of the Court's recent
interest in the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Assuming that

the court's interest would incline it to continue to hear such arguments, the
question is. whether this case properly presents the issue.

The record will

probably not provide much help in assessing the worth of either the "but for"
or the "good faith" issues.
Although resps' arguments on their fact are persuasive for dismissing the
second question, it might be appropriate to first call for a response from the
petr.
There is no response.
4/26/83
PJC

Schlueter

Brief and Ops App'd

- ,).
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SUPPLEMENI'AL MEMJRANDUM
May 19, 1983 COnference
List 1, Sheet 4
Motion of Respondents to vacate Writ
of Certiorari as Improvidently Granted

No. 82-357

MICHIGAN

v.
CLIFFORD, et al.
SUMMARY:

Petr has filed a brief response to the resps' motion to vacate

the writ as improvidently granted (see attached Legal Officer memo).

It

argues that its issue No. II was fairly encompassed in the state court briefs
and is properly before the Court.
FACTS:

The background facts are laid out in the attached Legal Officer

memo which addresses the resps' recent motion to vacate the writ.

The court

called for a response from petr and it has filed its reS£X>nse.
CONTENI'IONS:

\__,

~ I~

; SSII e- J .
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'Ihe petr' s summary response of fer s no help.

In its

'1 . Petitioner's Issue II in this Court was fairly encoopassed and
described by the issue as headed in the Petition for Certiorari. see
Rule 34.l(a). Although much more briefly presented in the state courts,
given the unliklihood of its acceptance there, Petitioner further submits
that the issue was fairly encompassed in the state court briefs in the
Michigan court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court.

2. The Brief on the merits, and the Petition itself, presented two
issues; certiorari was thus granted on two issues. Even if this Court
were to view Issue II as having expanded the issue, which Petitioner
. strongly submits is not the case, all of the Issu~ I and a large portion
of Issue II would remain. Dismissal or summary A~erment would thus be
inappropriate in any event.
'
3. Petitioner submits that· the issues in their entirety are
properly before this Court, and that the motion of Resp:mdent should thus
be denied.
DISCUSSION:

Issue IIl could present real problems.

First, the "but for•

issue was raised for the first time before the Mich. ct. App. which did not
squarely address it.

Resp has argued that that court implicitly declined to

face the issue because it had not been raised in the trial court.

In that

light, the record below probably won't provide much assistance in resolving
that issue.
,.

second, the "good faith" issue was clearly not raised below.

Resp's

argument that it was "disingenouously" added to Issue II is well taken.
Petrs' summary contention that the issue was fairly encompassed in the state
court briefs is not persuasive.

The connection, if there is one, between what

is raised in Issue II and what was argued below is tenuous.
Arguably, only that portion of Issue II which deals with the "good
faith" issue is clearly improvident; as noted, supra, the "but fot" issue was
raised in the state appellate court.

However, given the weak record on both

!Issue II reads:
"Should the exclusionary rule be applied in a situation
where the police conduct, even if viewed as improper,
was taken in good faith and was not a 'but for' cause
for the discovery of the items seized?"

points it would seem appropriate to dismiss Issue II in its entirety unless
I

the Court is clearly anxious to address the •but for• portion of the question.
There is a response.
5/16/83
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Questions Presented
1. Whether this Court should exempt from the warrant
requirement every class of administrative search where the
governmental interest in the search outweighs privacy interests,
thereby overruling Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and
County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
Seattle, 387

u.s.

541

(1967)~

(1967)~

See v. City of

Marshall v. Barlow's, 436

u.s.

307

(1978); and Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 486 (1978).

c~~~-r~~~
7-~~1,

2. If this Court retains the warrant requirement for most
administrative searches, whether the facts of this case fit
within the exigency exception recognized in Tyler and thus

3. If this Court retains the warrant requirement and holds
that the warrantless search and seizure does not fit within the
exigency exception recognized in Tyler, whether the Court should
recognize a sood faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this
case.
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I. Introduction
The Court apparently granted cert in this case to re-

(I

examine the warrant requirement in administrative searches.
Absent a desire to re-examine the Court's position in this area,
this case presents nothing more than a factual application of the
exigency exception applied in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 486
(1978).

As in Tyler, this case involves a warrantless

administrative search to determine the cause of a fire.

The

search was performed by arson investigators who arrived on the
scene 6 hours after the fire had been extinguished and the fire
"----?

officials had left.

The investigation disclosed evidence of

arson, which is the subject of the suppression motion challenged
here.
In Tyler, the Court restated its position that
administrative searches generally require warrants.

The Court

~

then held that the exigency exception justified one of the
administrative warrantless searches challanged there. In that

-

search, firemen had made a warrantless entry into a furniture
store to fight a fire.

The Court held that the warrantless entry

to fight the fire was constitutional under the exigency exception
and that officials could remain for a reasonable time after the
fire was extinguished to search for its origin. The Court then

/

applied the exigency exception to justify re-entry 5 hours later
to complete the search begun under the intial entry.

The Court

----~

I~~
.....:...--

held that the re-entry and the second search were merely
continuations of the intial entry and search and were likewise
exempt from the warrant requirement.
---(

...

Tyler would have been thoroughly conventional had it not
applied the exigency exception to justify a warrantless re-entry
by officials 5 hours after the fire had been extinguished.

Even

that application of the exigency exception was premised on such a
narrow set of circumstances that it hardly suggests a radical
departure from traditional 4th Amendment principles.

~~

However,

the decision apparently has kindled long-burning hopes that the
Court in time will exempt broad classes of administrative
searches from the warrant requirement.

This case tests that

hope.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Precedent
1. Administrative Searches Requiring A Warrant:

In

Camara v. Municipal Court of the City & County of San Francisco,
387 U.S. 523 {1967}, this Court required for the J((rst time that
officials obtain a search warrant before entering to perform an
administrative search.

That decision overruled Frank v.

Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had limited the warrant
requirement to criminal searches.

Camara held that a housing

official may not make a warrantless entry into a private
residence to make a routine area-wide inspection for possible ...
violations of the municipal housing code.

In another decJ..s\i'on

handed down the same day, the Court held that a fire inspector
may not make a warrantless entry into a locked commercial
~

warehouse to conduct a routine investigation for possible

violations of the municipal fire code.

See v. City of Seattle,

u.s. 541 (1967).

387

In reaching those decisions, the Court held to the
premise that "except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases, a search of
'unreasonable'
warrant."

priva~e

unless

£rO£ert~

without proper consent is

it has been authorized by a valid search

387 U.S. at 528-29.

At the same time, the Court

recognized that administrative searches to enforce municipal

~~th codes a~e fundamen~~y di~e~ from searches to obtain
~~i?ence of cr1me. No criminal search will be allowed absent a
~~ing of probable caus~ believe that a crime has been
~

committed and that evidence may be found on the place to be
searched.

To deny entry for routine inspections under municipal

health codes absent a showing of probable cause to believe that a
violation exists would frustrate municipal safety regulations.

lr-

Thus, the Court held that probable cause to issue a warrant to
conduct such inspections exists "if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection

A~~~~
~
-~~

are ,~~

satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." 387 U.S. at
538.

The warrant

r~quirement

in administrative searches,

therefore, is not to protect the innocent from intrusion, but to
ensure that intrusion is not arbitrary or used to harrass, and
that the entry and search are made and conducted in a reasonable
fashion.
The Court's decision

i~arshall

v. Barlow's, 436 U.S.

307 (1977), emphasized the primacy of the warrant requirement in
administrative searches.

.

'

In Barlow's, the Court rejected a
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congressional determination that warrantless safety inspections
under OSHA's detailed health and safety regulations were
constitutional.

Unlike the warrantless searches in Camara and

See, the warrantless OSHA inspections were expressly deemed
necessary by Congress, and Congress had provided some regulations
to govern those inspections.

Nevertheless, the Court rejected

Congress's determination that these warrantless inspections were
permissible under the 4th Amendment.
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1977), was decided the
~r

as Barlow's.

As mentioned above, Tyler merely restated

the proposition that all administrative searches ~ ntry
pursuant to a warrant except under certain well defined
exceptions.

Tyler then applied the exigency exception to justify

warrantless entry not only to fight the fire but to search for
its cause as well.

Having held that officials may enter a

burning house without a warrant, fight the blaze, and remain for
a reasonable time thereafter to search for its cause, Tyler also
held that certain re-entries by fire officials will be considered
a continuation of the intial entry, while others will be
considered a new entry requiring a warrant.
2. Exemptions From Administrative Warrants:
v.vB iswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)

In United States

(no warrant required for an

admini trative search of the commerical premises of a licensed
dealer),
72 (1970)

and~lonnade

Catering Corp. v. United States,

(no warrant required for an administrative

search of the commerical premises of a dealer licensed to sell

~

". '

----------~

the Court exempted from the warrant requirement

~-H~dlAadministrative searches of heavily regulated businesses.
~ Donovan

In

~

v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the Court applied the

~~~~~g~lated
have a long

business

exem~ ion

to an industry that did not

1story of federal regulation.

In that case, the

Court held that the warrantless inspections of mines provided for
in the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977 were permissible
under the 4th Amendment.

In that Act, Congress had declared a

substantial interest in ensuring safety in the mining industry.
The Act announced a detailed regulatory scheme to effect that
interest.

Safety inspections were a crucial aspect of that

scheme, and Congress had made an express declaration that
warrantless inspections were necessary to the success of the
scheme.

The Court found that the Act prescribed detailed

guidelines for such inspections and tried
the privacy interests involved.

scrupuously to protect

In light of these safeguards,

the Court deferred to the express congressional judgment that the
governmental interest in warrantless safety inspections
outweighed any privacy interests that were thereby compromised.

~

The disti~tion between Barlow's and Dewey lies in the ~-

I

detail of the regulations governing the search.

In Barlow's, the

Court found that much discretion had been left to the
investigating officials.

436 U.S. at 323.

In Dewey, the Court

found that the Act set out the permissible scope in specific
detail.

-

On the basis of that finding, Dewey held that "the

Court to construct a warrant exemption on totally different
grounds.

B. Facts
This case involves the warrantless search of a private
dwelling to determine the cause and origin of a fire.

Early in

the morning of Oct. 18, 1980, a fire erupted at the Clifford
home.

The Cliffords were out of town on a camping trip at the

time. The fire was reported to the Detroit Fire Dept., and fire
units arrived on the scene within two to three minutes of the
alarm.

The fire was extinguished and the fire units and police

left at 7:04 a.m.
At <. oo a.m. that same day, Lt. Beyer, a "certified
police officer fire investigator," (J.A.l6) 1 received a request
to investigate the Clifford fire.

.,/

The request was made by the

fire officials who had responded to the alarm.

Those officials

had noted suspected arson as the cause of the blaze and had
referred the matter to the fire arson unit.
request, Beyer performed other duties.
a~ed

at the Clifford home for the

Before acting on the

He and his partner

f~~e ~J~ OO

£ .m. on

Oct. 18.
On arrival, Beyer saw that men were boarding up the
house and pumping water from the basement.

He assumed that these

1 Lt. Beyer was a member of the Detroit Fire Dept. Apparently,
arson investigators attend the Police Academy and are sworn in as
special police officers. They have the authority to make
arrests.

men were agents of the owner's insurance carrier.

Beyer

testified that the house was severly damaged and uninhabitable.
(J.A.6) 2 Both the stairs to the second floor and the kitchen
floor had collapsed.
open.

The windows were broken and the doors were

Beyer testifed that he could not investigate until the

water had been drained out of the basement.
While Beyer waited for the water to be drained, he
questioned the neighbors.

A Mr. Mott informed Beyer that he had

contacted Mr. Clifford and that Mr. Clifford had called his
insurance agents to come secure the house against trespassers. 3
When the water was drained, Beyer and his partner entered the
house and began their investigation.

They sought no permission

to enter the house, but justified the warrantless
unwritten departmental policy.

(J.A.l2)

That policy permitted a

warrantless search of a recently burned building when the owners
were not present and the building was deemed open to trespass.
(J.A.7)

The policy permitted such warrantless searches only when

conducted on the day of the fire or on the day following a night
fire.

(J.A.20)
Beyer began his investigation in the basement (J.A.62)

and found that the fire had started there.

He found 3 fuel cans,

2on direct examination, Beyer was asked whether the house was
habitable or inhabitable. He answered that it was inhabitable.
From the context, I assume that he meant ~inhabitable. ~
3Resp's brief claims that this information is in Beyer's
Investigative Report, which Resp claims is in the record but
which is not included in the Joint Appendix sent to the Court.
The clerk's office is trying to obtain a copy of this •

.,

a crock pot, and a timer with attached wires under the basement
stairs.

The burn pattern indicated that the fire had started

there from a shortage in the wires attached to the timer.

The

timer was set to go off at 3:45 a.m. and had stopped around 4:30
a.m. (J.A.60}

Beyer and his partner seized this evidence and

then searched the remainder of the house.

(J.A.84} 4

The entire

search took 3 hours.
The Cliffords were charged with arson.

The evidence

seized from the basement was offered into evidence during a
preliminary examination.

The Cliffords moved to suppress it on

the ground that the entry and search were unconstitutional.

C. Decisions Below
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing during
which Beyer described his search.

Following testimony and

argument, the trial court found that the search was an
administrative search to determine the cause of the fire.

The

trial court denied the Cliffords's motion to suppress on the
ground that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry
and search. (J.A.39}

That decision was premised on Tyler.

The state court of appeals also found that the search
an administrative search, but reversed the trial court's
decision on the ground that there were

~exigent

justifying a warrantless entry and search.

circumstances

The court of appeals

4Page 4 of Beyer's Investigative Report is quoted in Resp's
Brief at 3, and indicates the scope of the house-wide search.

page 12
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found that the entry and search had not been motivated by the
belief that the evidence might be destroyed or that the fire
might be rekindled.

(Cert. Pet. at 15)

The court found further

that the arson search was not a continuation of the intial entry
and search made by the firefighters.

Because the court found no

exigency justifying the warrantless entry by Beyer, it held that
Tyler required exclusion of the evidence found in the search that
followed.

The state Supreme Court refused to review the case.

The evidentiary ruling is here on an interlocutory order.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Warrantless Entry for Administrative Searches
Although the facts of this case are strikingly similar

~

to those in Tyler, the primary issue here questions the wisdom of
this Court's decision in Camara.

Petr asks that the Court

~.;.,

overrule Camara and its progeny and exempt from the warrant

~

~-nd.t
requirment all classes of administrative searches where there ~

generally can be no showing of traditional probable cause and
where the government's interest in the search outweighs the
individual's interest in being free from government intrusion.
Petr argues that such classes of searches should be subject only
to the reasonableness requirment of the 4th Amendment.
Petr's argument is a variation on an old tune, and one
with which the Court is obviously uncomfortable.

The argument

rests on the premise that the two clauses of the 4th Amendment
are separate and equal.

The first clause states that all

searches must be reasonable.

• .,. :

'

'I·~

~

The second states that all warrants

bench memo: Michigan v. Clifford
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Nothing in the 4th

Amendment requires that all searches be made pursuant to a
warrant.

However, to ensure protection of 4th Amendment rights,

this Court generally has applied the rule that warrantless
searches of private property are per se unreasonable.

Since

Camara, the Court has applied that rule to administrative as well
as criminal searches.

Exceptions to the warrant requirement are

relatively few and are well defined.
Petr picks no quarrel with the per se rule in the
criminal context, but argues that such a rule is inappropriate in
the context of most administrative searches.

Petr argues that to

require a warrant for such searches distorts the probable cause
requirement.

This is the same argument that Justice Stevens made

in his Barlow's dissent.

Petr suggests that the Court adopt the

following analysis instead.

First, determine whether a given

class of administrative searches normally would be accomplished
upon a showing of probable cause as traditionally understood.

If

not, then the warrant clause is inapplicable to that class of
search.

Second, determine whether that particular class of

search is reasonable.

This determination, Petr argues, turns on

whether the government interest in the search outweighs the
individual's interest in being free from government intrusion.
If the government's interest is superior, Petr argues that the
administrative search should be allowed without a warrant and
should be subject only to the reasonableness requirement of the
4th Amendment.

bench memo: Michigan v. Clifford
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Camara took a different approach.

It lowered the

standard of probable cause, but insisted on a warrant.

Camara

permitted administrative warrants to issue without a showing of
traditional probable cause for two reasons: first, requiring such
a showing would lead to an unacceptable level of enforcement in
an area of substantial public interest; and, second, any
intrusion on privacy interests would be so minor as to be
outweighed by the substantial public interest in conducting the
search.

Camara reasoned that administrative searches are less

intrusive than criminal searches because they are less personal
and less adversary.

387

u.s.

at 537

Both Camara and Petr would

facilitate administrative searches, but Petr's approach entails
no prior judicial review.
Under the Camara analysis, no search may proceed until
there has been a prior judicial determination that the type of
search involved normally cannot be justified by traditional
probable cause and that the public interest in the search
outweighs any intrusion that might occur.

Under Petr's analysis,

the search may proceed without prior judicial review because no
warrant is required.

Those responsible for the inspection

determine whether the inspection normally can be justified by
traditional probable cause.

If it can, they must marshall the

evidence, go to a magistrate, persuade him that the evidence
constitutes probable cause, obtain the warrant, and return to
execute it.

If the inspectors determine that the inspection

generally cannot be justified by traditional probable cause, they
may not obtain a warrant.

They nevertheless may inspect if they

determine that the need to inspect outweighs any intrusion that
may occur.

Such a system provides a clear incentive not to find

probable cause.

Furthermore, there is no prior judicial review

limiting the scope of the search and ensuring that the public
interest in the search outweighs any intrusion that might occur.
Under Petr's analysis, the searches still will be subject to the
reasonableness requirement of the 4th Amendment, but the searches
likely will go unchallenged by all but those charged with
wrongdoing on the basis of evidence seized in such searches.
believe that such an approach is unjustified.

I

If we plug this

particular case into the Court's current approach to
administrative searches, this becomes clearer.
The Court has not required a warrant for all
administrative searches.

See Biswell, Colonnade, and Dewey.

~

Having determined that an administrative search may proceed
without traditional probable cause, the Court conducts a second
balancing test to determine whether that search may proceed
without a warrant.

It is only where the government's interest in

conducting a warrantless search outweighs privacy interests that
this Court has allowed entry without a warrant.
U.S. at 533.

See Camara, 387

Applying that test to the administrative search at

issue here, the argument would be that the burden of obtaining a
warrant to determine the cause of a recent fire is likely to
frustrate siginificant government interests to a greater degree
than it is likely to occasion unconstitutional intrusions on
privacy.
reasons.

I disagree with that general assumption for several

~~

~~

~·r~fv~~~~·
~ requiring the kind of warrant necessary to
conduct an administrative search of this nature will not hamper
the government's interest in ensuring against fire hazard because
------------~

a traditional showing of probable cause is not required.
Officials need only demonstrate to a neutral and objective
judicial officer that the requested administrative search is
reasonable with respect to the particular place to be searched.
If immediate inspection is necessary to ensure against fire
hazard, a warrantless search may be proper under the traditional
exigency exception. 5

~ it is wrong to assume that the administrative
search of a recently burned building always will be reasonable.
The reasonableness of an administrative search is premised in
part on the belief that it will present a minimal intrusion on
existing privacy rights.

The measure of intrusion turns largely

on the privacy rights in the places or things to be searched.
Although a fire certainly may decrease one's expectations of
privacy, the decrease will depend on the amount of fire damage,
the nature of the structure, the length of the interim between
fire and search, and the owner's salvage efforts in that interim.
I believe that this case in particular proves incorrect a general
assumption that the privacy interests in recently burned premises
always are minimal and that prior judicial review thus will serve
no purpose.

The fire occurred in a private residence.

The blaze

5The state court specifically found that no exigency existed in
this case. Cert. Pet. at 15.

rendered the house uninhabitable, but did not raize it.

(J.A.60)

The primary structure remained intact and the owner's personal
belongings, such as clothes, pictures, and stereo equipment,
remained inside. 6

After the blaze was extinguished and the

firefighters had left, the owner requested that his insurance
carrier secure the house against trepass. 7
When the arson
investigators arrived 5 hours later, the house was being secured
by the owner's insurance carrier. (J.A.6,8)

The privacy

interests in the damaged Clifford residence certainly were more
pronounced than the privacy interests in the gutted and
smoldering furniture store in Tyler.

~ it is often difficult to distinguish between an
administrative and a criminal search, especially where the
officials responsible for conducting the administrative search
are responsible for conducting any criminal search as we11. 8

To

avoid the risk that officials may mistake a criminal search for
an administrative one that requires no traditional showing of
probable cause, it seems preferable to require a prior judicial
determination of the proper nature and scope of the search.

As a

practical matter, prior judicial review is important not so much
because officials in good faith may mislabel the object of the

6This information comes from page 4 of Beyer's Investigative I
Rept. quoted in Resp's Brief at 3.
7Again, this comes from Beyer's Investigative Rept.
8The arson investigators in this case have the power to make
arrests and are responsible for ferreting out arson as well as
determining the cause and origin of a fire.

search, but because the scope of the search may expand beyond
what is constitutionally permissible. 9
The quest for criminal evidence under the authority of
an administrative search is not objectionable merely because the
object of the investigation becomes the acquisition of criminal
evidence.

Assuming that a constitutional search is already in

progress, investigators who become suspicious of arson should
be required to stop that search and obtain a criminal warrant

ot __.
I~

before they begin to look for evidence to confirm their
suspicion.

That result would be ridiculous because it would

protect the privacy of suspected wrongdoers more than that of
innocent fire victims, and because it would be impossible to
distinguish the search for cause from the search for evidence of
arson.

However, one justification for permitting the

administrative search to proceed on less than traditional
~

probable cause is the belief that the intrusiveness of the search
will be minor compared to the public interest thereby served.

To

ensure that the balance does not change when the object of the
search becomes the quest for criminal evidence, arson inspectors
must not intensify the scope of their administrative search
without first acquiring a warrant authorizing them to do so.

9of course, judicial review should also ensure that officials
do not undertake a search for criminal evidence where they lack
traditional probable cause by deliberately mislabeling the search
administrative. There is no evidence here that the arson
investigators deliberately violated the Cliffords's 4th Amendment
rights by disguising a criminal search as an administrative
search. There is no evidence that the Fire Dept. intended its
policy to be used to effect such a disguise.

.. .

t.

f.·

:s~~J.;~

~4~
The administrative search into the cause of a fire ~
should be limited to structural defects, faulty
defective wiring, etc.

appliances,~

It should not expand under the suspicion

of arson to rummaging in closets, desks, and drawers - at least
not without a warrant obtained on a showing of traditional
probable cause.

This case in particular shows the wisdom of

prior judicial review limiting the scope of the administrative
search.

After entering the Clifford horne without a warrant and

discovering the cause of the fire in the basement, the
investigators went on to conduct a warrantless search of
remainder of the house.

This search took 3 hours.

The

investigators rummaged in closets and drawers and inventoried the
pictures on the wall, the audio-visual equipment in the rooms,
and the tapes and records in the cabinets. 1

°

For these three

reasons, I do not believe that the government's interest in
warrantless post-fire searches outweighs the interest in
protecting 4th Amendment rights.
One may accept the above rationale and still question
whether the administrative warrant required in Camara will add
any protection to 4th Amendment rights in this case.

The warrant

requirement in Camara provided prior judicial scrutiny to ensure
that area-wide searches for housing code violations were not
~

undertaken arbitrarily or to harrass.
here.

There is no such danger

The number of premises subjected to post-fire searches

10 This description of the house-wide search comes from Beyer's
Investigative Rept. at 4 quoted in Resp's Brief at 3.

'

'

will be limited by an objective and readily determinable event fire.

One could argue, therefore, that a warrant to inspect

recently burned buildings serves no purpose.
rejected this argument in Tyler.

The Court properly

The Court found that prior

judicial scrutiny of post-fire inspections had other purposes to
serve.
As in all administrative searches, it is necessary to
balance the need to inspect against the possible intrusion.
Unlike the case in area-wide routine inspections, in post-fire
inspections this balance will vary from case to case.

"In the

context of investigatory fire searches, which are not
programmatic but are responsive to individual events, a more
particularized inquiry may be necessary."

u.s.

at 507.

Tyler, supra, 436

Factors to be considered in determining the

reasonableness of a post-fire search include the scope of the
search, the time of day of the search, the lapse of time between
fire and search, the continued use of the building, and the
owner's efforts to secure the building or to make repair.

Id.

Tyler held that the weighting of these factors is best performed
by prior judicial review.

I agree.

Absent exigent

circumstances, I believe that post-fire searches present an even
stronger case for the warrant requirement than the search in
Camara because there are more factors to take into the balance
and those factors vary more widely from search to search than the
factors involved in Camara.
Similarly, the case for an exemption from administrative
warrants is not nearly so strong in this case as it was in either

Barlow's or Dewey.

In both Justice Stevens's dissent in Barlow's

and the majority opinion in Dewey, the case . for allowing
warrantless administrative searches was based on the fact that
those searches were conducted on commercial premises pursuant to
a statutory scheme wherein Congress had expressly authorized such
searches and had determined that the government had a substantial
interest in conducting warrantless searches that outweighed
privacy interests.

The majority in Dewey deferred to this

congressional determination after concluding that the safeguards
to privacy interests provided in the Act made the warrantless
searches reasonable within the meaning of the 4th Amendment.

The

majority also concluded that the detailed guidelines governing
the search made prior judicial scrutiny less crucial.

Such is

not the case here.
The Detroit Municipal Fire Prevention Code gives the
Fire Marshall the authority to investigate the cause of fires
explosions.

If there is reason to believe that arson is the

cause, the Fire Marshall may "take custody of all physical
evidence relating to the cause of the fire .•• and .•• continue
the investigation to conclusion." Ordinance No. 314-H, Sec. 23-13.5.

The Municipal Code also provides that before entering a

private dwelling, fire officials must obtain the consent of the
occupant or an administrative warrant.

Entry may be made without

either consent or a warrnt in emergency situations where the fire
official "knows, or has reason to believe" that circumstances
exist that "reasonably may constitute immediate danger to life
and property."

Sec. 23-1-3.4.1.

The only other guidelines

governing the right of fire officials to enter and search are
provided in the Fire Dept.'s unwritten policy, which was
described at the suppression hearing as follows:

[W]e encourage our investigators to make the scene [of
the fire] and make the association if at all possible
where the fire opening is in effect.

Our day crew does

most of the fire scene ivestigation, we tell them to
make an entry into the property that had a fire the
previous night if the property is open to trespass.

If

it is severly fire damaged, we tell them to make that
entry and make the investigation.

If the property is

occupied, or if it is a business place and people are
trying to conduct business, then we instruct the people
to ask for consent or to obtain an administrative
search warrant where appropriate.
Testimony of Capt. Monroe (JA19)

B. Exigency Exception under Tyler
If Camara and progeny remain good

~Wd(_

law~s

case becomes

merely a factual application of the exigency exception recognized
in Tyler.

Tyler held that under the exigency exception

"officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a
reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it
has been extinguished."

436 U.S. at 510.

As with the intial

entry, what constitutes a reasonable time within which to remain
and investigate depends on the exigency that creates the

y

'

exception.

While the fire is the exigency that justifies the

entry, "[p]rompt determination of the fire's origin ••• to
prevent its recurrence •.. [and] to preserve evidence from
intentional or accidental destruction" is the exigency that
allows the firemen to remain and search.

Id.

As I read Tyler, it requires two things of the

warrantless administrative search.

~·

the search must

f'b!'
~

~

made pursuant to the intial entry justified by the blaze or by ~$
some other exigency.

Second, the search must be for the purpose

-

of spotting the origin of the fire so as to prevent its
recurrence "through the detection of continuing dangers" or "to
preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." 11
Id.

The Court found that both conditions were satisfied by the

early morning search in Tyler.

Because the search had begun

under the intial entry and was completed within a time within
which it would have been reasonable to remain and search, the
Court held that "[u]nder the circumstances, we find that the
morning entries were no more than an actual continuation of the
first, and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the
resulting seizure of evidence."

436 U.S. at 511.

In the present case, the state court made a factual
determination that there was no exigency underlying the
challenged search.

(Cert. Pet. at 15)

~

/.)..~

~
The state court also ~

~~~
.I

11Although the object of the search may later become the quest
for evidence of arson, the motivation for the warrantless search
must be to determine the cause of the blaze. See note 10 supra.

found that under the facts of this case the re-entry and search
were not continuations of the first entry and search.
facts arguably justify these findings.

Id.

The

By 7:04a.m., the

firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left.

On the basis

of their efforts, the firefighters reported to the arson
investigators their suspicion of arson.

The arson investigators

arrived on the scene for the first time 6 hours after the fire
had been extinguished and the firefighters had left.

At the time

they arrived, the fire was completely extinguished and the house
was being secured against trespassers by the owner's insurance
agents.

Under these facts, the state court reasonably could

conclude that the search was not concluded within a time within
which it would have been reasonable to remain and search.
~~

Having

found no exigency to exempt the entry and search from the warrant
requirement, the state court held that the seizure of evidence
was unconstitutional.

Accepting the holding of Tyler, I see no J
reason to disturb the state court's ruling. 12

C. Good Faith Exception
Petr argues that the exclusionary rule should not apply
in this case because the government's conduct, even if viewed as
improper, was taken in good faith.

Petr argues in the

alternative for a more narrow good faith exception where the

~s~

12Although I believe that the warrantless search of
may have been justified under the exigency exception, I find it
hard to say that the state court's finding to the contrary is
clearly erroneous •

. : ::.~

..

I

~~,~~--·~~~

(U,~~~~~~

exclusionary rule would not apply absent a finding that the ~r 1J I G~~
police officer's conduct was taken in bad faith, or on an ~~~
unreasonable belief that it was authorized, and was a "but for"
cause for the discovery of the evidence seized.

As to these good

faith issues, Resp has moved to dismiss c: rt as improvidently ~~
~
----------------------------~------II •
J ,
/)1AA:> ~
granted. I recommend that Resp's motion be granted. ~

---

The "but for" argument was first made before the Mich.

Ct. App., which did not squarely address it.

There is a dispute

over whether the Ct. App. failed to address the issue because it
had not been raised in the trial court, or whether it rejected
the argument sub silentio.
not raised below.
~

The broader "good faith" issue was

The facts supporting a "good faith" exemption

in this case are not good in any event.
The "but for" argument seems to rest on the "inevitable
discovery" doctrine, under which evidence will not be excluded as
"fruit of the poisonous tree" if its discovery would have been
inevitable even without the 4th Amendment violation.

Petr's

argument seems to be that because the evidence would have been
discovered in a search conducted under a warrant, the warrantless
search was not the "but for" reason for discovery.

This argument

misapplies the inevitable discovery doctrine.
This is not a good case to create the broader good faith {
exception for the reasons Mark pointed out in his Oct. 19, 1982
memo to you.

Although the arson investigators did not violate

the Cliffords's 4th Amendment rights deliberately, the violation
occurred because the investigators were following a policy that

----------------~-------~
was clearly unconstitutional
under this Court's decisions
-----------------~

.. ,,

-

---

--J
~

Camara and Tyler.

Applying the exclusionary rule in this case

might promote deterrence by prompting the Detroit Fire Dept. to
adopt policies that conform to the constitutional principles
announced by this Court.

Furthermore, there was no exigency or

other circumstance justifying the failure to obtain a warrant in
this case.

There was an unhurried six-hour delay between the

fire and the search.

The arson investigator testified that a

warrant could have been obtained in that time.

In sum, this is

not a good case to consider a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.

III. CONCLUSION
If this Court wants to de-emphasize the primacy of the
warrant requirement in administrative searches, it should not
~ choose

~

this case to do it.

There are three reasons why this case

is not a good means of achieving that goal, all of which are
related.
First, the line between an administrative search into
the cause of a fire and a criminal search for evidence of arson
is a hazy one.

In this case, the arson investigators crossed
\
that line and undertook an extensive warrantless search in quest
~

of criminal evidence.

-

Prior judicial review limiting the scope

of the administrative search would have prevented that.
Second, one argument for exempting administrative
searches from the warrant requirement is that the requirement
does not provide additional protection to 4th Amendment rights.
That argument may be true where there are legislative or

.

"•. /~
,.

r

administrative guidelines governing such searches and judicial
review merely ensures that a particular search conforms to those
guidelines.

The argument is unconvincing in this case where

there are no legislative guidelines and the only administrative
guideline is an unwritten policy that leaves much discretion to
the investigating officials.
Finally, another argument for exempting administrative
searches from the warrant requirement is that the privacy
interests at stake are likely to be less than in criminal
searches.

Because the privacy interests at stake are less, the

intrusion is not as great and the argument is that there is less
need to provide added protection in the form of prior judicial
review.

This argument would have been more appealing in Tyler

than here.

In Tyler, the search involved the smoldering remains

of a furniture store.

In this case, the search involved a

private residence in which private belon 'n s remained and which

----

had been secured by the owner against trespass.

t

The state court may have been wrong to find that the

arrantless search of the basement in this case did not fit
ithin the exigency exception recognized in Tyler.

However, the

factual application of Tyler hardly merits this Court's plenary
review.

Discontent with the result in this case should not lead

the Court to adopt an excessively broad exemption to the

~

administrative warrant that may not be justified in other
contexts.

October 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM
RE: Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357

opinion in
our prior conversation I
justify the warrantless basement search on the basis of
On re-reading, it seems to me that the primary
the decision in Tyler was to expand the narrow reading that
Michigan court had given the fire exigency exception so that fire
officials need not leave with the dousing of the last flame.
Thus, this Court held:
an entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and ••.
once in the building, officials may remain there for a
reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze.
Thereafter, additional entries to investigate the cause
of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant
procedures governing administrative searches." 436

u.s.

at 511
Applying this holding to the facts before it) the

~ourt

sought to illustrate when investigatory searches fall within the
fire exigency it had just announced and when they require a
warrant, consent, or some other exigency.

The Court pointed out

that application of the language "remain within the building for

a reasonable time" must recognize that the circumstances of
particular fires and the roles of fire officials in combatting
them varies widely. See 436

u.s.

at 510 n.6

For example, a fire

in "a single-family dwelling that clearly is extinguished at some
identifiable time presents ffew] complexities" id.: the fire
officials enter to put out the blaze, remain long enough to
determine its origin, and leave.

All re-entries require an

administrative warrant, consent, or a new exigency.

Fires in

other structures may present different problems and may require
that the fire officials remain for a longer period of time,
entering and re-entering the building. Id.

Before a court can

determine whether a warrantless post-fire investigation is
justified by the fire exigency, it must balance the particular
circumstances confronting the fire officials against "the
individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy." Id.
With these considerations in mind, the Court in Tyler
held that the early morning re-entry by fire officals into the
burned out warehouse was merely a continuation of the intial
search.

Because both the intial search and its continuation

occurred within a time within which it would have been reasonable
to remain, the re-entry fell within the fire exigency.

~hus,

there was no need to obtain an administrative warrant, consent,
or to identify a new exigency before making that entry.

It was

as if the fire officials had begun the search immediately after
the blaze was out, discovered that they needed additional tools,
left to qet them, and had returned immediately.

~he

facts in

this case are distinguishable: they suggest additional

attenuation between the intial entry to extinguish the fire and
the entry to search for cause as well as increased expectations
of privacy in the interim.
The fire fighters left the Clifford house at 7:04 a.m.
Their job done, they turned the incident over to the arson
division.

The arson investigators arrived for the first time 6

hours later.

When they arrived they learned that the owner had

instructed a work crew to secure the house against intrusion.
The crew was at work when they arrived.

Even if the interim

between fire and search had been of the same duration as in
Tyler, and some of the same officials had returned to make the
investigation, I would find this case distinguishable from Tyler
in two important respects: first, the fire occurred in a private
residence rather than a commercial warehouse: and, second, in the
interim between the intial entry to fight the fire and the reentry to investigate its origin, the owner had instructed his
insurance company to secure his home against further trespass.
find it very difficult to say that the re-entry in this case was
a continuation of the intial entry and that it falls within the
fire exigency exception to the warrant requirement.
Other exigencies might have justified the warrantless
entry into the basement, such as preserving evidence from
imminent destruction or ensuring against the possibility of
rekindling.

However, the state court expressly found that the

re-entry was not motivated by either of those exigencies: "[The
arson officials) did not enter the premises for the purposes of
ensuring that the blaze would not rekindle or to prevent the

I

iminent [sic] destruction of evidence."
finding.

The record supports this

Lieut. Bever testified that if the owners had been on

the premises, he would have requested consent before entering and
lacking that would have obtained an administrative warrant.

If

the house had been boarded up when he arrived, he would have gone
for an administrative warrant before making the entry.

This

testimony confirms the state court's finding that the entry was
not made under any new exigency.
Unless the Court wants to create an exception to the
warrant requirement that allows fire officials to re-enter the
premises of a recent fire within a reasonable time to investigate
its cause, I would affirm the state court's holding that the
warrantless entry into the basement was unconstitutional in this
case.
To my mind, this case illustrates why such an exception
would be undesirable.

If the arson investigators had obtained an

administrative warrant, the warrant presumably would have
restricted the scope of the search to a determination of cause.
This effectively would have limited the search to the basement
and would have prevented the upstairs intrusion.
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
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and it is well

written.
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* * *
The process from here on, as you will remember,
is as follows:

(i} prepare a second draft in light of my

review,

free

feeling

to edit amy changes and

any of this with me;

( i i}

to the extent you make changes

that fairly could be viewed as substantive,
to see them;
suggested

to discuss

I would like

also if you draft footnotes along the lines

above,

I

would

turn the draft over

like

to see

these;

(iii}

then

to your editor, still in Atex form;

(iv} if arguably substantive changes are made, I would, of
course,

like

to

see

them;

(v}

then

move

to

a

printed

Chambers Draft, with copies to be reviewed by all five of
us.

The two clerks, to whom the draft is new, should feel

free

to suggest editing

as well as substantive changes.

But you remain the responsible clerk,

and should try to

work out any differences before you bring a master copy of
the Chambers Draft back to me.

't'·

;rfi!"t

4.

I would like to circulate this opinion prior to
the Thanksgiving break.

L.F.P., Jr.
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Rider A, p. 1 (Clifford)

CLIFFl SALLY-POW
This case presents questions as to the authority
of arson investigators, in the absence of either exigent
circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence
without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent
fire.

lfp/ss 11/12/83

Rider ~ ' Pag~ 4 (Clifford)

CLIFF4 SALLY-POW
We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears to
exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.

lfp/ss 11/12/83

Rider A, p. 16 (Clifford)

CLIFF16 SALLY-POW
The searches of the Clifford horne, at least
arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones:
search of the basement area,
search of the residential portion of the house.

the delayed
extensive
We now

apply the principles outlined above to each of these
searches.

'

'
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w.. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR .

October 7, 198 3

No. 82-357

Michigan v. Clifford

Dear Chief,
Lewis will undertake the opinion
for the Court in the above.
Sincerely,
/

I

II
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I

'I

.
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i

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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~u.prtmt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 23, 1983
Re:

No. 82-357

Michigan v. Clifford

Dear Lewis:
In due course I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,
~·

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

' I '
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C HAM B ERS OF

JUSTIC E

w ... J.

BR E NNAN, JR .

December 2, 1983

Re: Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-357
Dear Lewis:
As I mentioned when we spoke yesterday, I agree with much of
what you have said in the text of your opinion in the above and I
will be happy to join. However, I do have some reservations
about the language of certain footnotes, which seem to me to go
beyond what is necessary either to decide the present case or to
clarify the scope of Tyler.
1. In note 4 at page 6 you offer an explanation of several
circumstances under which officials may, in the words of the
Tyler opinion, "remain in a building for a reasonable time to
investigate the causes of a blaze after it has been
extinguished." 436 u.S. at 510. It strikes me that your
explanation is perhaps too broad. May not it suggest to some
readers that a considerable amount of time may elapse before the
type of "post-fire search" that you describe is conducted? I
would be happier with a formulation more along the lines of the
one stated in !J[ler itself, which suggested more directly that
such searches must be conducted immediately after the fire has
been extinguished: "Prompt determination of the fire's origin may
be necessary to prevent its recurrence, as through the detectio? AJ~~
of con tin u);:hg dangers such as faulty wiring or a defective
~y- ,__.}furnace. ~Immediate investigation may also be necessary to
~~
preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction . " ~t
436 u.s. at 510. ~
~

2. In note 5 at page 6 you briefly recite the relevant
~~
standard for securing an administrative warrant. Here again, ~ ·~
would not a more detailed explanation, such as that found in
Tyler, be more helpful? E.g., "To secure a warrant to
investigate the cause of a fire , an official must show more than . ~
the bare fact that a fire has occurred .••. In the context of · ~.
investigatory fire searches, which are not programmatic but are ~
responsive to individual events, a more particularized inquiry
may be necessary . The number of prior entries, the scope of the 3 ~
search, the time of day when it is proposed to be made, the lapse ~~
of time since the fire , the continued use of the building, and
, ~
the owner's efforts to secure it against intruders might all be .v {p ·
relevant factors . Even though a fire victim' s privacy must
~
normally yield to the vital social objective of ascertaining the .~
cause of the fire, the magistrate can perform the important
~-

function of preventing harassment by keeping that invasion to a
minimum." 436 U.S. at 507-508.
3. You also explain in note 6 at page 7 that firemen may,
after removing rubble at the scene of a fire, seize evidence
under the plain view doctrine, even though that evidence
obviously was not literally in "plain view" at the time they
initiated the search. The question whether the plain view
doctrine permits fire officials to seize evidence without a
warrant after sifting through the rubble of a fire or searching
"other areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found" is
not before us in this case and I would prefer not to reach out to
decide this question without the benefit of specific facts and
briefing that will help to focus our decision. More importantly,
doesn't your assertion go considerably beyond the scope of
Coolidge v. New Hampshire? The opinion of the Court in that case
repeatedly stressed that when law enforcement officials
"inadvertently come across evidence" that is in plain view they
may lawfully seize it. 403 U.S. at 465-466 (emphasis added). In
contrast, it seems to me that your footnote suggests that
firefighters may intentionally search through rubble and
unspecified "other areas" until they come across evidence of the
cause of a fire; doesn't that statement go too far and, in any
case, isn't it unecessary to decide this case?
4. The last sentence of note 7 at page 9 seems, in my view,
open to the reading that commercial warehouses will rarely if
ever qualify for the protections of the Fourth Amendment. But as
we said in Tyler, "the basic purpose of the Amendment is to
safguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials . • . . [This] privacy
that is invaded may be sheltered by the walls of a warehouse or
other commercial establishment not open to the public." 436 u.s.
at 504-505. Perhaps your note could be recast to indicate that
while commercial premises are certainly entitled to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, there may be circumstances
in which such premises evidence reduced expectations of privacy.
5. Finally, I am worried that the last sentence of note 9
at page 10 ("Considerable latitude must be given to the
compelling state interest in thourough investigations in the
causes of recent fires") is perhaps too sweeping a statement that
may be misread by lower courts.
I' 11 probably be able to go along even if you find no reason
to make changes. But I'd really be more comfortable if these
suggestions appealed to you.
Sincerely,

~ll

W.J.B., ,Jr.
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MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD
AND EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MICHIGAN
[December - ,

1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
Six Terms ago in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978),
we first addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause to the activities of fire fighters and
inspectors following a fire at a warehouse. A divided Court
held that the fire itself was an "exigent circumstance" which
allowed entry to extinguish the fire and authorized investigators to remain for a reasonable time to investigate the cause
of the blaze. Id., at 509--510. We also held that a "re-entry" a few hours after these officials had departed was an "actual continuation" of the earlier investigation, but that subsequent visits more than three weeks after the fire required an
administrative warrant. Id., at 511. These precepts of Tyler have not proved easy to apply, and we are told in the
Court's opinion in this case that "we granted certiorari to
clarify doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our
decision in Tyler." Ante, at 2. But that same opinion demonstrates beyond peradventure that if that was our purpose,
we have totally failed to accomplish it; today's opinion, far
from clarifying the doubtful aspects of Tyler, sows confusion
broadside. I would hold that the "exigent circumstances"
doctrine enunciated in Tyler authorized the search of the
basement of the Clifford home, although the remaining parts
of the house could not have been searched without the issuance of a warrant issued upon probable cause.
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Judging simply by comparison of these facts to those in Tyler, I believe that the basement inspection conducted by Lt.
Beyer about 1:30 p.m. on October 18th-some six hours after
the fire was extinguished and the fire officials and police had
left the Clifford premises-was an "actual continuation" of
the original entry to fight the fire, as that term is used in Tyler. The fire fighters who fought the blaze at the Clifford
house had removed a can containing Coleman lantern fuel and
placed it in the driveway of the home, where it was later
seized and marked as evidence by the inspectors who arrived
about 1:00 p.m. Thus here, as in Tyler, the investigation
into the cause of the fire went on contemporaneously with the
efforts to fight it, before the fire fighters first left the
premises in the early morning. I see no reason to treat the
six-hour delay between the departure of the fire fighters and
the arrival of the investigators in this case any differently
than the Court treated the five-hour delay between the departure of the investigators at 4:00a.m. from the Tyler warehouse and their return to the same premises at 9:00a.m.
The Court seeks to distinguish the two situations on the
basis of differences which seem to me both trivial and immaterial. It says that in that interim in our case, the Cliffords
"had taken steps to secure their privacy interests that remained in their residence against further intrusion." Ante,
at 8. While this may go to the question of whether or not
there was an invasion of a privacy interest amounting to a
search, it has no bearing on the question of whether there
were exigent circumstances which constitute an exception to
the warrant requirement for what is concededly a search.
The Court also intimates that the "fire fighters" did nothing
but fight the fire, and that the arson investigation did not begin until the arson investigators arrived at 1:00 in the afternoon. Ante, at 8-9. But fire fighting and fire investigation
are obviously not this neatly compartmentalized, as is shown
by the fact that the fire fighters themselves had removed the
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Coleman lantern fuel can for inspection by the later team of
arson investigators.
The Court also purports to distinguish the facts in Tyler by
the statement that "the privacy interests in the residenceparticularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store. . . ."
Ante, at 9. But if the furniture store in Tyler is to be characterized as "fire damaged," surely the Clifford's residence
deserves the same characterization; it too was "fire-damaged." It is also well-established that private commercial
buildings in this context are as much protected by the Fourth
Amendment as are private dwellings. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 542-543 (1967) (citing cases). And certainly the public interest in determining the cause and origin
of a fire in a commercial establishment applies with equal, if
not greater, force to the necessity of determining the cause
and origin of a fire in a home.
On the authority of Tyler, therefore, I would uphold the
search of the Clifford basement and allow use of the evidence
resulting from that search in the arson trial.
II

In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and
See v. City of Seattle, 387 tJ. S. 541 (1967), this Court imposed a warrant requirement on city housing and fire inspectors requiring them to obtain an administrative search warrant prior to entering a building to inspect for possible health
or fire code violations. To protect the privacy interests of
building owners from the unbridled discretion of municipal inspectors, the Court held that administrative searches had to
be conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained from an independent magistrate. Camara, 387 U. S., at 534. But in
light of the important public interest in abating public health
hazards, the relatively limited invasion of privacy inhering in
administrative searches, and the essentially non-criminal
focus of the inspection, a different kind of warrant was estab-
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lished, a warrant described by the dissenters in that case as
"newfangled." See, 387 U. S., at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Probable cause to issue this kind of warrant did not sound in
terms of suspicion of criminal activity, but in terms of reasonable legislative or administrative standards governing the decision to search a particular building. ld., at 538.
One may concede the correctness of the Camara-See line of
cases without agreeing that those cases should be applied to a
post-fire inspection conducted to determine the cause and origin of a fire. The practice of investigating the cause and origin of fires has long-standing and widespread acceptance.
The public interest in conducting a prompt and careful investigation of the cause and origin of all fires is also undeniably
strong. An investigation can reveal whether there is a danger of the fire rekindling and assess the effectiveness of local
building codes in preventing and limiting the spread of fire.
It may bring to light facts suggesting the crime of arson.
Entry is also necessary because the causes of a fire may also
not be observable from outside a building or by an uninformed occupant. See United States v. Green, 474 F. 2d
1385, 1388-89 (CA5 1973). Certainly these reasons justify a
search to determine the cause and origin of a fire.
The concerns regarding administrative searches expressed
in Camara and See to justify the imposition of a warrant requirement simply do not apply to a post-fire investigation
conducted within a reasonable time of a fire. Under the
emergency doctrine, it is beyond dispute that fire fighters
may enter a building in order to extinguish the flames.
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1976). In their efforts to control the blaze fire fighters may knock in doors and
windows, chop holes in roofs and walls, and generally take
full control of a structure to extinguish a fire. In the aftermath of a fire an individual is unlikely to have much concern
over the limited intrusion of a fire inspector coming into his
premises to learn why there had been a fire. Fire victims,
unlike occupants at ordinary times, generally expect and wel-
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come the intrusions of fire, police, and medical officials in the
period following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers
such as insurance agents will frequently have authority to
enter the structure. In these circumstances, the intrusion of
the fire inspector is hardly a new or substantially different
intrusion from that which occurred when the fire fighters
first arrived to extinguish the flames. Instead, it is analogous to intrusions of medical officials and insurance investigators who may arrive at the scene of the fire shortly after its
origin.
Ample justification exists for a state or municipality to authorize a fire inspection program that would permit fire inspectors to enter premises to determine the cause and origin
of the fire. But in no real sense can the investigation of the
Cliffords' home be considered the result of the unbridled discretion of the city fire investigators who came to the Cliffords' home. 1 No justification existed to inspect the Cliffords' home until there was a fire. The fire investigators
were not authorized to enter the Cliffords' home until the
happening of some fortuitous or exigent event over which
they had no control. Thus, if the warrant requirement exists to prevent individuals from being subjected to an unfettered power of government officials to initiate a search, a
warrant is simply not required in these circumstances to limit
the authority of a fire investigator, so long as his authority to
inspect is contingent upon the happening of an event over
This is made abundantly clear by the Detroit Fire Department's policy
regulating post-fire investigations. That policy encourages investigators
to conduct an investigation as promptly as possible. If the property is occupied or is a place of business trying to conduct business, inspectors are
instructed to obtain consent or an administrative warrant. If the
premises are occupied by children, inspectors must obtain consent from an
adult before entry. To inspect premises secured from trespass, investigators must obtain consent or an administrative warrant. Only if the owners
are away and the building open to trespass may fire investigators enter
without consent or a warrant. Joint Appendix, at 9a, 12a, 19a (testimony
of Lt. Beyer and Capt. Monroe).
1
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which he has no control. 2
In my view, the utility of requiring a magistrate to evaluate the grounds for a search following a fire is so limited that
the incidental protection of an individual's privacy interests
simply does not justify imposing a warrant requirement.
Here the inspection was conducted within a short time of
extinguishing of the flames, while the owners were away
from the premises, and before the premises had been fully secured from trespass. In these circumstances the search of
the basement to determine the cause and origin of the fire
was reasonable. 3

The Tyler majority stated that a major function of the warrant requirement was to provide a property owner with sufficient information to
reassure him of the legality of the entry. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S.
499, 508 (1976). The relationship of this informational function and the
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is not clear. Some
attempt at notice or proper identification should allay any reasonable fears
that the inspectors are impostors or lack authority to inspect for the origin
and cause of the fire.
3
There may be some justification for requiring the inspectors to notify
the building's owners of the inspection. Where, as here, the owners were
out of town, it does not appear unreasonable to have conducted the inspection without prior notice to the owners. Notice simply informs the building owners that the building will be entered by persons possessing authority to enter the building. Yet the failure to notify the Cliffords prior to
entry fails to advance in any significant way the purposes of the exclusionary rule. In point of fact, the fire investigators were told the Cliffords
were unavailable, that they had gone fishing. J.A., at 16a. Thus, in
these circumstances the failure to notify the Cliffords seems reasonable.
The Cliffords can also be deemed to have received constructive notice, because their agents were on the scene, and a neighbor apparently ascertained the legitimacy of the inspectors' visit.
2
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This case is here on
Appeals of Michigan.
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to the Court of

We granted th1s case to consider the

application of the Fourth Amendment/to searches for the
cause of fires, particularly where arson is suspected.
The Cliffords' private residenc~/was damaged by an
early morning fire while they were out of the city.
Firefighters extinguished the
after

blaz~nd

departed shortly

7:00a.m.~ Some five hours later, a team of a ~so2. in-

vestigators arrived.
During this 5-hour interval, / the Cliffords - informed of the fire - had instructed thei r insurance agent to
board up their home.

~ftewgh -rhe investigators were told

-r~~
of these instructions by neighbors 6 they entered the

premises~without

""

either an administrative or a criminal war-

rant, j and conducted an extensive search of the entire house.
Evidence of arson ~nd of intent'

to commit arson ylwere

found both in the basement and in the upper residential
areas •

......

\

.The Cliffords, ' charged with arson, (moved to sup~

press this evidence.

Although the trial court denied the

motion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed.
Firefighters, of course, have a duty to extinguish
a fire, and also to make an immediate determination of its
cause.

If evidence of arson is found by the firefighters/

in the course of their duties, this rwrmzt:t.:y.. would be
admissible.
In Michigan v. Tyler, decided in 1978, we recognized a distinction between the role of firefighters; (and
that of arson investigators who normally come in later.
In Tyler, although the firefighters' investigation
was interrupted for several hours.

We held that their re-

turn - under the facts in that case - was a continuation of
their original investigation.
f

The situation in the present case / differed substantially.

The second warrantless

searc~as made by arson

investigators,jwho first arrived five hours after the
firefighters had completed their duties and left the scene.
The fire involved a private
ture store.

residenc~ ather than a furni-

And the owners of the

1

residence~ /by

arranging

to have their home boarded up;~ had evidenced a continued
expectation of privacy.

/

.'

.

ford residence~violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-

--

ment rights.

Accordingly, we affirm that part of the judg-

- exc~uded
-

ment of the Michigan cour yfthat
within the house.

evidence seized

Other evidence, Jdiscovered in plain view

outside of the residence ,jwas

ad~~-s~ible, and we reverse the

judgment as to it.
My opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall.

Justice Stevens has filed a concurring opin-

ion, in which he joins the judgment.
Justice Rehnquist has filed a dissenting opinion
in which the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor join.
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RE: Cases Held for Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-357

TO: The Conference
FROM: Justice Powell

Three cases were held for Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82357, and will be discussed at the January 20, 1984 Conference.
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CONNECTICUT v. ZINDROS, No. 82-1800 (Cert. to Supreme Court of
Connecticut)

A fire severly damaged a restaurant on February 12,
1977.

At the time of the fire, the building was owned by one

party, but leased and occupied by another.

After the fire, the

landlord boarded up the building, replaced the door, and kept the
door locked and the building secure from trespass.

The tenant's

private property (valued at $6750 after the fire) remained within
the building, he continued to pay rent, had access to the
building, and stated on several occasions that he intended to
reopen the restaurant.
On February 23, 1977, 11 days after the fire, the
landlord consented to a warrantless search of the premises by
arson investigators.

The search revealed evidence of arson for

which the tenant was charged.

Prior to trial, the tenant

successfully moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search on
the ground that the search violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.

The TC found that there were no

exigencies justifying this post-fire search, that the tenant
retained both subjective and legitimate expectations of privacy,
and that the landlord could not give valid consent for the
search.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed.
Under Clifford, I believe that the state court properly

concluded that the tenant had legitimate expectations of privacy
in the fire-damaged premises.

Although the building here is not

a private residence, the expectations of privacy exist because of

3

the significant efforts to secure the building against trespass,
and the fact that the tenant continued for eleven days after the
fire to house valuable private property there.

The primary issue

seems to be whether the landlord's consent was valid.
is factbound and not certworthy.
I recommend that the Court deny No. 82-1800.

That issue

4

CONNECTICUT v. SCHONAGEL, No. 82-2117 (Cert. to Supreme Court of
Connecticut)

An early morning fire broke out at a tire dealership on
September 23, 1977.

Because the fire damage was so great, the

building was ordered demolished.

Demolition was completed and

the debris hauled away on September 26, 1977.

At noon that day,

police learned that arsonists probably set the fire with
gasoline.

They immediately sent officers to search the building

site for the remains of gasoline cans.

These were found and the

next day samples of dirt and brick were taken.

Respondent was

charged with arson and moved to suppress the evidence as fruit of
an illegal search.
convicted of arson.

The TC denied the motion and Resp. was
On appeal, the Conn. Supreme Court held that

the evidence should have been suppressed and reversed.

The State

seeks cert. on that issue.
The Conn. Supreme Court found that the TC had made an
"implicit finding" that resp retained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the building's ruins.

It then held that because there

were no exigencies justifying the warrantless search, the search
was unconstitutiona1. 1

On the facts presented here, I believe

that there were no legitimate expectations of privacy.

At the

time of the search, the building had been reduced to rubble and

1 Because resp had not contested the expectation of privacy
finding on appeal, the state supreme court reviewed under a
plainly erroneous standard.

< '.

5

all its contents were ash and ruin and exposed to public view.
Society should hardly be expected to respect privacy interests in
such a situation.
I recommend that the Court GVR No. 82-2117 in light of
Clifford.
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ZEISLER v. ILLINOIS, No. 83-5165 (Cert. to Appellate Court of
Illinois (3d District))

'

'

'

'

I

extinguished by 2:
apartment complex were told that it was safe to re-enter.
Immediately after the fire was extinguished, the fire marshall
began a search into its origin.

Because he was a novice and

needed assistance in the investigation, he stopped his search
until such assistance could be obtained. 2 He left the scene and
later called for assistance at 6:30 a.m.

A State Deputy Fire

Marshall arrived at noon and the two men drove to the apartment.
Before they entered, the Deputy Fire Marshall suggested that they
obtain a warrant.

They then drove 16 miles to the State

Attorney's Office, where they were told that they did not need a
warrant.

They drove back and searched the apartment.

not suspected at that time.

Arson was

As soon as the search began to

disclose evidence of arson, the fire marshalls stopped their
search and obtained a criminal search warrant.
On the basis of the evidence found in the two searches,
petitioner was charged with arson.

He moved to suppress the

evidence on the ground that the first search by the fire
marshalls was unconstitutional.

Because probable cause to obtain

the criminal search warrant was based on the first search, the
2The fire occurred in a very small community and the fire
marshall was only a part-time fireman •

.,

'
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second search also was unconstitutional.

The TC denied the

motion to suppress, petr was convicted of arson, and the state
supreme court affirmed.
There were no exigent circumstances and there was every
opportunity to obtain an administrative warrant.

In any event,

it may be appropriate to afford the Illinois Court an opportunity
to review this case in light of Clifford.
I recommend that we GVR No. 83-5165 in light of
Clifford.

DRAFT OPINION (November 9, 1983)
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POWELL, Associate Justice

This case presents the question whether,

in th

L

absence of either exigent circumstances or consent, arson

7

•

investigators must obtain an administrative warrant before
entering a private residence to investigate the cause of
ecent fire.
o
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Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were
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inconsistent with

of
~r<?

(tLf~,
Michigan v.

Tyler,

436 U.S.

499

(1978) ,

"

"'~--.

.

and

4.

that

the

warrantless

Cliffords'

residence

nonconsensual

violated

their

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

search
rights

the

of
under

the

---------------------

~

~

/4

II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a
fire erupted at the Clifford home.
of

town

on

a

reported

to

the

Detroit Fire Department,

the

scene

arrived

on

extinguished

camping

and

all

trip

at

The Cliffords were out

around
fire

the

5:42

time.

a.m.

The
and

fire

was

fire units

The

fire

officials and police

was

left the

premises at 7:04 a.m.
At
Lieutenant
section

of

8:00
Beyer,
the

a.m.
a

on

fire

Detroit

the

morning

investigator
Fire

of

the

fire,

with

the

arson

Department,

received

5.

instructions
informed

to

that

investigate
the

Fire

the

Clifford

Department

~~ UiMA ~ l-o ~)--<--~
~Lieutenant

-

~

'-"' -

w::·:::~"A _ w

d1d

:"a .prisotJe,,
-

bn

cl>,

~~
~

not

residence~

Clifford

~
.

Beyer

fire.

He

suspected

was

arson.

)

proceed

immediately

and his partner

to

the

~preeeo•ed ey

~~:; a mult ~;: :: ·

~~ arnvJ" at

the

1\

~~

1\

1:00 p.m. on October 18 •

.-1
When

the

arson

Clifford residence,

investigators

arrived

at

the

they found a work crew on the scene.

The crew was boarding up the house and pumping water out

c::z,.

of the basement.

0~ o~ tAQ Cl~fora' ~ neighbor y told the

~

.

investigators that he had AGo~tastQg f6i, . Cl1fford and

~

t~:hatr--

~~#f~~- ~~

had ..\instructed +H:-6 1\insufance agent to send

a_
~

crew out to secure the house against trespass.

j\

neighbor also

~

iRfor~ea

1\

.·.

eA&m that

;r:

s

Cliffor ~

The

did not plan

6.

~~k1~
to return to

tb ~>•e

While~

waited

imres&..i:'~a'l!ors/1

found a

seeAe that day.

for the water to be pumped out, too

~' J.-t,..J- ~
Coleman fuel can in the driv~QJ i'+!e-r seized t-Aat car?--

A

as evidence

.U

By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner)

g.ple

~

obtaining

consent

or

an

warrant,

administrative

(~

c:' ' I
j_nvestigato~s
entered
Pjs
their

investigation

the

Clifford

residence

into the cause of

and

the fire.

began
Their

search began in the. basement and they quickly discovered
that

the

fire

had

originated

beneath

the

basement

1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire
officials who had fought the blaze.
The firemen removed
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer
discovered it on his arrival.

7.

stairway.

~ a~son investi~~tected
.-1

of fuel throughout the basement, and
Coleman fuel cans beneath the
dug

through

BQ¥Qr

the

debris

found two more

~airs.

- -,k~
b@neaeh

1\

~

a strong odor

the

stai H3 1

r.j

As they
euten,ant

J-t-<._ ~A--~ ~

and

his

p&u:: tner 1 found

a

crock pot with attached

wires leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into
an outlet a few feet away.
at

approximately

3:45

approximately 9:00 a.m.
4:00

and

4:30

a.m.

The timer was set to turn on

a.m.

and

to

turn

back

off

at

It had stopped somewhere between

r2L.L~~~

~~e

iRvestigator•

seizeg

the

two

~~.-..,A~ .
ad.._9 it ional Coleman fuel cans,

the crack pot. the

Respondents

......

(

.. ,

H XXIEH' 1

-

~

mov::J(~

8.

the

concerning

their

search

·~

After determining that the fire had originated in
the

basement,

Lieutenant Beyer

the remainder of the house.
followed

was

extensive

and

and

his partner

searched

The warrantless search that
thorough.

The

investigators

called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the
house.

They

found

searched

through

drawers

them full of old clothes.

and

closets

and

They looked through all

rooms :i..n the b.om:e
and noted that there were nails on
•
the

walls

cassettes

but
for

a

no

pictures.

They

A

on the

up~i~~

wiring

and

selectavision video tape machine but no

machine. l[ Respondents moved to excude
I

found

~·

search.

~~~-~

al~

testimony based

They claim that the entire search

"'
from
I

the

basement

to

the

second

floor

bedrooms

was

a

9.

search to gather evidence of arson, that it was conducted
without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, and
that it therefore was per se unreasonable under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.

Petitioner, on the other hand,

~fwJ...

argues that the search was reasonable and should be exempt
1\

from the warrant requirement.

III

In

its

petition

argument before this Courl
the

state

court's

finding

for

certiorari

c;;;;;-~n

oral

~

the State -d±d not challenge
that

there

"

were

no

exigent

circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford horne.
Instead, it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement

.•

10.

all

administrative

investigations

into

the

cause

and

origin of a fire.
In

Tyler,

we

~~f-S"
our £irm position

restated

that

"\

administrative

r

~ ~'

at 504-508.

4 3 6 U.S.

307

(1978) •

(1967):

searches generally

Camara

require warrants.

See Marshall v.
v.

Municipal

See v. City of Seattle, 387

u.s.

~

reaffirm
carefully

that

!i>Oe-±t-ion

defined

again

classes

of

387
541

Except

today.
cases,

436

u.s.

U.S.

523

Barlows,

Court,

the

See

(1967).
in

We

certain

nonconsensual

entry and search of property protected by the Fourth and
is unreasonable unless it has been

Fourteenth Amendments
authorized by a valid

warrant.~

ft:is
constitutionality
onto fire-damaged

t.

~ ....

does

end

the

inquiry.

nonconsensual

The

en~

turns on several factors.

The

11.

first
~

.

)
)

(

is

whether

interests

in

there

the

are

trn:ras io-r?."- The

legitimate

privacy

p rope r t y ....-------=i:;J:~FI'-;:;vt:iJ)~,_JTf.,-h_e___.;?~

fire-damaged

prap~t, ~no~~;~a ~ the
qover mttent

any

.,

Fourth Amendment.froffi anyl_

second

is

whether

exigent

circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless
of

~

~.n:y

expectations of privacy.

lil~i:~im~e

The third is

1\

whether the object of the search is to determine the cause
of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
We

~in

observed

~~

~t~r e~ts

may

'\

may

go

offices
private

on

remain

a

effects

~Nz.a.gy

b

in

in fire-damaged

in

their

fire.
often

premises." Tyler, 436
o~

~
le~itiffiate
privacy

that

1\

living

after

Tyler

u.s.

homes

Even

or

when

remain

premises.
working

that
on

the

is

"People
in

their

impossible,
fire-damaged

at 505

fire-damaged

property wi 11 vary with

the

?

12.

~ ~Ju_ rf ~~ ;~
amount

of

_f..

damage,

the

prior

and

continued

use

of

the

~~~

premises,

and

intruders.

the owner 1 s

-1

Some

fires

efforts

may

be

to secure

so

it against

devastating

that

no

~
~giti~.te

privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins,

regardless of

the owner 1 s

subjective expectations.

The

~'-f._;>
test of -3:e'!Ji:tiJHatQ priuacy iRt9rests i "(an objective one:

~

L-v

~~ society ~ epared to respect and protect those interests

~~he
Katz

v.

United States,

concurring).
the

389

U.S.

347,

~

If

],.e~itimate

fire-damaged

property,

privacy
the

applies, and any official entry onto
made

pursuant

circumstances.

~~.

'r •

arise~See

particular circumstances in which they

to

a

warrant,

361

(Harlan,

interests
warrant

remain

in

requirement

~ t prep~rt¥

consent,

J.,

or

must be
exigent

that

justifies a

fight the blaze.

warrantless

entry by fire officials to

Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in

the building, officials need no warrant to remain for "a
reasonable

time

to

investigate

the

after it has been extinguised." 436

Wt

l~~~

ere

J{ l-e~iti~a-te

fire-damaged

expectations

property,

of

cause

u.s.

the

at 510

privacy

additional

of

blaze

He\~e·;,er ~

remain

in

investigations

the

begun

after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police
officials

have

left

the

pursuant to a warrant or

scene
the

generally

must

be

made

identification of some new

exigency.
Determining the cause and origin of a fire serves
a compelling public interest to ensure against future fire
hazard.

'

~~oro

....

'.

The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies

14.

that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain

admi~ve

ar

warrant or to secure the owner's consent to

inspect fire-damaged premises.

In such cases, the warrant

~
requirement ~1 not apply. 2

If

there

-

are

no

exigent

nonconsensual search of . the property must be

L~ ~ OL~~~ ~~~~ J~--:o/
~---=:...---~
toA~ warrant.

If the object ef th~ seare~is to determine

the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative
warrant must be obtained.
officials

need

show

only

To obtain such a warrant, fire
that

a

fire

of

undetermined

origin has occurred on the premises, that the scope of the

2 For

example, an immediate threat that the blaze might
rekindle presents an exigency that would
justify a
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation.
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence might be exempt from the warrant
requirement.

15.

proposed

search

is

reasonable

and

will

not

intrude

unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy, and that the
search will be executed at a

time. ~}rf

reasonable and convenient

the object of the search is to gather evidence

of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a
showing

of

probable

cause

~b)
e found

ev1'd ence t\ w1ll
evidence of

criminal

to

believe

that

oriiftinal SL_

.
1n
the place to be searched.

activity

is

discovered

during

If
the

course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized
under the "plain view•

doctrine~dence

then may

be used to establish probable cause to obtain a criminal

~-~.

('1

search warrant.

H~

-tire officials may not rely on
"t

this evidence to expand the scope of their administrative
search

without

first

making

a

successful

showing

probable cause to an independent judicial officer.

of

16.

The object of

the search

is

important even

if

E~i~ent ~ rcumstances that

exigent circumstances exist.

justify a warrantless search for the cause of a fire may
not

justify

a

search

to

gather

evidence

of

criminal

activity once that cause has been determined.
example,

the

immediat~-

administrative

search

is

If,

for

by the

~ustified

need to ensure against rekindling, the scope of
....

~

the search may be no broader than necessary to achieve its
A

end , anoe

ffttHii-~-~

-em::~

~~

~nd

i!t

ael:li~wQd-;-

ARY

~
search
-1

to gather evidence of criminal activity not in plain view
must

be

made

traditional

pursuant

showing

of

to

a

probable

criminal
cause.

warrant

J

Applying

~
~
'1

a

these /
{

( hree factors to the facts of this case, we must determine \
the

search

of

the

-----------

------

Clifford's

f ire-damag: J

17.

Amendments

IV

The Clifford home was a two-and-a-half story brick
and frame residence.

Although there was extensive damage

to the interior structure, the exterior of the house
largely

undamaged

by

the

fire.

The

~
~

had

firemen

broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze.
partner

arrived,

At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his

the

c~z~~

home

was

uninhabitable.

_l5u..,-f
t'Re -Gl: Hforee-'1\. personal belongings
.

remained)

~

~ , and ~ Clifford had arranged to have the house
secured

against

intrusion

in his

absence.

Under

these

18.

circumstances,

and

in

light

of

the

especially

strong

a_
~

expectations of privacy connected with

home, we hold

1\

~a-bk

that the Cliffords retained l9gitiJRate privacy interests
in

their

fire-damaged

investigations were
Thus,

the

~

of

the

residence

subject

warrantless

and

basement and tRe

house

~
~

valid

to

and
the

warrant

nonconsensual
~ r~R

only

if

~
4l,Qy post-fire

that

requirement.

~r.~

search~

of A the

~

ef the upstairs r.QgioRs
exigent

circumstances

/\
justified the object and the scope of each.

is not entirely clear whether

the post-fire

basement was an administrative

.•

19.

search to determine the cause of the fire or a search to
gather

evidence of

arson.

Respondents contend

that

the

firefighters had made a preliminary investigation into the
cause
that

and
it

origin
had

of

begun

the
in

fire,

the

that

they had determined

basement,

and

identified its cause as probable arson.

that

they

had

They argue that

the sole purpose of Lieutenant Beyer's subsequent search
was to gather evidence of the suspected arson.
argument,

the

State

conceded

that

the

At oral

firefighters

had

made a preliminary investigation and had determined that
the

fire

likely.

had

begun

in

the

basement

and

that

arson

was

~

Its position seems to be that the investigation

4

~ ~ ~ a+kw-H...t- ~h~ ~~
c'h-.5lkR<)eo

btS~

was

undertaken

for

a dual purpose -

to

"'

determine the cause of the fire and to seize evidence of

a..-1- ~~~- ~) ~
object,

-1

t:fl-M search

was subject to

20.

~~~,H:t:k
the warrant requirement.
~ l"leORBelisaa:l

The

Sta~~

-has

eet:~cQde.il

that tl::la

search of the basement was not made pursuant

to either an administrative or a criminal warrant, and it

~~~
.~
t ances
~
110 ex1gen t
c1rcums

~re

.

~

~

. Ut-'f
. lR9
t-h' i
J
S,Y

&tBa:tc h •

.

J P.M .. -'flia~ ~ hold that the warrantless entry and search of the
1

A

basement of the Clifford residence
~
updqr the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3

In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search
of

a

furniture

store,

despite

the

absence

of

exigent

3The search was made pursuant to a policy of the Arson
Divison that allowed nonconsensual warrantless entries
onto fire-damaged premises as long as they were made
within a reasonable time after the fire, the owner was not
present, and . the premises were open to trespass.
This
policy did not attempt to identify exigent circumstances,
but focused more on the question whether there were
legitimate expectations of privacy in the premises.
As
applied here, the polic.
_
~ consistent with o r ~ interpretations
'0 Fourth Amendment.
,-6

'J, '

the

scene

to

begin

their

search

six

hours

after

the

firefighters had extinguished the fire and left the scene.

· 7@-

In the interim, the Cliffords had taken

~
effor~s to secure

the

in

privacy

interests

~~ esidence . against

~

~ ~ c~a.J;..ly

further

remained

their

private

intrusion.

separate the entry

;:;::::-.. -1

from

~--

distinguish? this
Uf3Aeld

that

that

i:-A

made

+¥~

J

to
se..arch

....__"'

At least where a homeowner has taken

significant steps to secure his fire-damaged horne after
the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a post-fire search
must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the

So .L.vn-t ~ ~
identification of some new exigency. /~~
4

A~~~~
~ ~ ~ ~
A--. 4"2 dt-c. .. -L~~

1f-cAu-,

~~~
7
pag~s.

Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following

,.

'

23.

B.

»Wst~s Se~h

(1.7~~

After they had located the origin of the fire and
/

~rs

etermined its cause, the arson investi
search

of

the

of

rummaged in
the

the

undertook an
They

house.

pictures throughout

house,

the
in

pictures

the

rooms,

on
and

the

wall,

the

the

tapes and

house i s:;..---''i~X'1P.,~uLa.;a.iiD.iiD.il"b.:~lL-'ti.._-o~Rt-J1~~~·-a~~cr~:re-crr"Cn

gather

in the cabinets.
l

~~~~~~~ ~I
1\

11..£ ~4+U. i'f
evidence

of

the

~

He.-. ~ e 4;~~·

crime

of

arson. A

Absent

exigent

4This is not to suggest that individual expectations of
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety. For
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an
apartment complex, the exigency exception may allow
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to
ensure against an immediate fire hazard.

24.

circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant ,

Even

~-ditta~

the 1\ basement

if

administrative

search,

upstairs search.

it would

search
not

had

been

have

a

valid

justified the

As soon as the investigators determined

that the fire had originated in the basement and had been
pot

and

timer

found

beneath

the

.f)~

caused

v~~

basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to

by

the

crock

the basement area.

Although the investigators could have

used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, . they

could

not~r~earch

without

a

prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable

cause

had

been

made.

Because

there

were

no

exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and

25.

it

was

without

a prior

showing

of

probable

cause before an independent judicial officer, we hold that
unreasonable under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments,
basement search.
The
regions

of

regardless of the validity of the

~ Ft-N'~

L

warrantless
the

Clifford

intrusion

into

the

house

presents

upstairs
a

telling

illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of
proposed

administrative

searches.

An

administrative

search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire
officials licence to roam freely through the fire victim's
private residence.
obtained

in this case,

the scope of

t

.,'11'

If an administrative warrant had been
it presumably would have limited

the proposed

investigation and would

have

26.

prevented

the warrantless

intrusion

into the upper

rooms

of the Clifford horne.

v

The

J(
onx pieces

of

physical

evidence

that

have

been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three
empty fuel cans,

the electric crock pot, and a timer and

attached

Respondents

cord.

also

have

challenged

the

testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless
search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of
the Clifford horne.

Two of the fuel cans, the crock pot,

the timer and cord, and the investigators' testimony were
discovered

as a

result of the unconstitutional post-fire

search of the Clifford's residence.

Thus, we affirm that

27.

portion of the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals
that excluded
discovered

in

that evidence.
plain

view

in

One of the fuel cans was
the

Seizure of this evidence was proper.

Cliffords'

driveway.

To the extent that

the Michigan Court of Appeals excluded that evidence, we
reverse.

'•

lfp/ss 11/12/83

Rider A, p. 1 (Clifford)

CLIFFl SALLY-POW

This case presents questions as to the authority
of arson investigators, in the absence of either exigent
circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence
without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent
fire.

lfp/ss 11/12/83

Rider ~ ,

Page 4 (Clifford)

CLIFF4 SALLY-POW
We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears to
exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.

"

} r. •'

lfp/ss 11/12/83

Rider A, p. 16 (Clifford)

CLIFF16 SALLY-POW
The searches of the Clifford home, at least
arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones:

the delayed

~~ .

search of the basement area, acg tQePQafter the extens1ve
/1

search of the residential portion of the house.

We now

apply the principles outlined above to each of these
searches.

21.

circumstances, on the grounds that it was a continuation
of a valid search begun immediately after

the fire.

As

the

this

is

State

conceded

at

oral

\ \-\ ~ (.,..-\--~ fk~

distinguishable

·1

investigation

into

flames

being

were

interrupted
soon

as

In

the

fire

cause

smoke had

officials

of

doused.

by smoke and

case

j

Tyler,

the

argument,

the

That

darkness,

fire

began
as

their

the

last

investigation

was

but was completed as

cleared and daylight had dawned.

Because the immediate post-fire search was interrupted for
shor ~

only a

~ ~~ ~~ 4!4"fh4d
period of time, a-Ad the owoQr Rae made -AG.. ) "-.J <..

~

)';~f~t~
~ ~

~

held

t<> """"'"e !tis pr tvacy

that

the

early

i~• ~ ~
iA

morning

search

was

continuation of the valid sear;:egun earlier.

~ ~;

tbe me

wfo v-<-~~

~w- ~

~,yt:~

1

~J:

r-y;
merely

a

·IJ-

here~ ~r v-~8 ~~~ ~
~

r

. .Ju-

y

~yr · .u4'wr ~ ,. )
J

r'vrf~

~ ~

~.r>-.~.~~ ./ ,J~\~~k~~ 0C11/ Y.)
_prwW u~ ~ ~
;.;x ~· ~ ~~ rJf cK

?

)P

}'~lltJc- ?~lP~

_ I

-"'-"•

J .J. .

, _ ~ ·
OL .t'k, _.,_.....,' '-'-">

()

{)_

tl
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DRAFT OPINION (November 14, 1983)
Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357

I

POWELL, Associate Justice

'

'

/"'

tf

Z.J
2.~

2,'-l-

z 7, ;-

This case presents questions as to the authority
of arson investigators,
circumstances
without

a

or

warrant

in the absence of either exigent

consent,
to

to

enter

investigate

a

private

the cause of

residence
a

recent

fire.

I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were
arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire

r

2.

at

their

private

residence.

At

held

establish

probable

examination

alleged offense,

to

the

preliminary

cause

for

the

the State introduced various pieces of

physical evidence, most of which was obtained through a
warrantless

and

fire-damaged

nonconsensual

home.

search

Respondents

of

moved

the

to

Clifford's

suppress

this

evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation
of

their

rights

Amendments.

under

the

Fourth

and

Fourteenth

That motion was denied and respondents were

bound over for trial.
suppress

the

Before trial, they again moved to

evidence obtained during

the

search.

The

Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied
that

motion

on

the

justified the search.

ground

that

exigent

circumstances

The court certified its evidentiary

3.

ruling for

interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court of

Appeals reversed.
That

court

circumstances
that

the

held

that

justifying

warrantless

the

entry

there

no

Instead,

search.
and

were

search

of

exigent
it

the

found

Clifford

residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson
Division of

the Detroit Fire Department

such searches as

a

Appeals
Michigan

v.

warrantless
residence

to

reasonable
held

that
Tyler,

~

~

'

trespass,
time

this
436

violated

of

and

the

policy

u.s.

nonconsensual
their

[Fourteenth Amendments.

.,

sanctioned

long as the owner was not present, the

premises were open
within

that

The

fire.
was

499
search

rights

the search occurred
Court

inconsistent

(1978),
of
under

and

the
the

that

of

with
the

Cliffords'
Fourth

and

We granted certiorari to clarify

4.

doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our
decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a
fire erupted at the Clifford home.
of

town

on

a

reported

to

the Detroit Fire Department,

arrived

on

extinguished

camping

the

trip

scene

and

all

at

The Cliffords were out

around
fire

the

5:42

time.

a.m.

The

fire

was

and fire units
The

fire

officials and police

was

left the

premises at 7:04 a.m.
At
Lieutenant
section

of

instruct ions

8:00

a.m.

Beyer,
the
to

a

on

fire

Detroit
investigate

the

morning

investigator
Fire
the

of

the

fire,

with

the

arson

Department,
Clifford

fire.

received
He

was

5.

informed

that

the

Fire

Department

suspected

arson.

Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant Beyer did not
proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.

He and his

partner

fire

finally

arrived

at

the

scene of

the

about

1:00 p.m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the
scene.

The

crew was

boarding up the house and pumping

~~/.1.0<'~~

j

water

out

of

investigators
instructed to

the

that

he

basement.
had

~e

A

called

neighbor

Clifford

told

the

had

been

and

Clifford insurance agent to send

1\

a

boarding crew out to secure the house.

also

advised

that day.
be

pumped

that

the Cliffords did

The neighbor

not plan

to

return

While the investigators waited for the water to
out,

they

found

a

Coleman

fuel

can

in

driveway that was seized and marked as evidence. 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

the

6.

By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without
obtaining consent or an administrative warrant,

entered

the Clifford residence and began their investigation into
the cause of the fire.

Their search began in the basement

and they quickly discovered that the fire had originated
beneath

the

basement

stairway.

They detected

a strong

odor of fuel throughout the basement, and found two more
Coleman

fuel

cans

beneath

the

stairway.

As

they

dug

through the debris, the investigators also found a crock
pot with attached wires
that was plugged

leading to an electrical timer

into an outlet a

few

feet

away.

The

1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire
officials who had fought the blaze. The firemen removed
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer
discovered it on his arrival.

.'

.

7.

timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to
turn back off at approximately 9:00 a.m.
somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m.

It had stopped

All of this evidence

was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in
the

basement,

Lieutenant Beyer

the remainder of the house.
followed

was

extensive

and

and

his partner

searched

The warrantless search that
thorough.

The

investigators

called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the
house.

They

searched

through

found them full of old clothes.
and

noted

pictures.

that
They

there
found

were

drawers

closets

on
and

the

walls

cassettes

selectavision video tape machine but no machine .

..,

"'

and

They inspected the rooms

nails

wiring

and

but

no

for

a

8.

Respondents

moved

to

excude

all

exhibits

and

testimony based on the basement and upstairs searches on
the ground that they were searches to gather evidence of
arson,

that

they

were

conducted

without

a

warrant,

consent, or exigent circumstances, and that they therefore
were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

Petitioner, on the other hand,

argues that

the entire search was reasonable and should be exempt from
the warrant requirement.

III

In

its petition for certiorari,

the State does

not challenge the state court's finding that there were no
exigent

{'

' '

'

circumstances

justifying

the

search

of

the

9.

Clifford

horne.

Instead,

it

asks

us

to

exempt

from

the

warrant requirement all administrative investigations into
the cause and origin of a fire.

We decline to do so.

In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that
administrative
U.S.

searches generally

at 504-508.

(1978);

Camara v.

See Marshall v.
Municipal Court,

See v. City of Seattle, 387
that

view

defined

again

classes

require warrants.

today.
of

cases,

u.s.

387

in

u.s.

436

u.s.

541 (1967).

Except
the

Barlows,

523

307

(1967);

We reaffirm

certain

nonconsensual

436

carefully
entry

and

search of property protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments

is unreasonable unless it has been authorized

by a valid warrant. 2

2The Court has recognized the legality of warrantless
administrative
searches
in certain carefully ee£iued y
Footnote continued on next page.

(,~~~
,..... 1'7" ~
~~_,..P

?~~,,
~

't

10.

This

does

not,

however,

end

the

inquiry.

The

constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries
onto fire-damaged

premi~n

whether

1\

there

are

several factors:
legitimate

privacy

interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected
by the Fourth Amendment )

T~

whether exigent

circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless

~

of any reasonable expectations of privacy j

.!:Phe

thir~

i~

1\

whether the object of the search is to determine the cause
of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.

circumstances.
See, e.g., Donovon v. Dewey, 452 u.s. 594
(1981)
(heavily regul~ted business): United States v.
Biswell, 406 u.s. 311 (1972) (same): Colonnade v. United
States, 397 u.s. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
administrative warrant recognized in these cases are not
applicable to the warrantless search in this case.

11.

A.

We

reasonable

privacy

expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises.

"People

may

go

offices
private

on

observed

living

after

a

effects

premises."

Tyler,

in

in

Tyler

their

often
436

homes

Even

fire.

that

when

remain

u.s.

or

at

that

on

505

the

in

some

is

in

their

impossible,
fire-damaged

Privacy expectations

will vary with the type of property,
damage,

working

the amount of fire

the prior and continued use of the premises, and
cases

intruders.

the owner 1 s

Some

fires

efforts

may

be

so

to secure

it against

devastating

that

no

reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins,
regardless
test

of

the

essentially

owner 1 s

subjective

is

objective

an

expectations.
one:

whether

The
"the

12.

expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize
as

'reasonable.'"

Katz

v.

United States,

361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
442

u.s.

735,

739-41

389

u.s.

347,

See also Smith v. Maryland,

(1979).

If

reasonable

privacy

interests remain in the fire-damaged property, the warrant
requirement applies, and any official entry must be made
pursuant to a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances.

B.

A burning building - of course creates an exigency
that

justifies a

fight the blaze.

warrantless

entry by fire officials to

Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in

_j '

the building, officials need no warrant to remain for "a
reasonable

...~ ..

time

to

investigate

the

cause

of

the

blaze

13.

after it has been extinguised." 436 U.S. at 510

Where,

however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the
fire-damaged

property,

additional

investigations

begun

after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police
officials

have

left

the

scene) generally

must

be

made

pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies
that will not

tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a

warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect firedamaged

premises.3

Because

determining

the

cause

and

3 For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might
rekindle presents an exigency that would justify a
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation.
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence ~ be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
~

~

.,·· ... .
~,

14.

origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the
warrant requirement does not apply in such cases.

c.

If

a

warrant

is

necessary,

the object of

search determines the type of warrant required.

the

If the

object is to determine the cause and origin of a recent

.r

fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.

To obtain

such a warrant, fire officials need show only that a fire
of undetermined origin has occurred on the premises, that
the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and will

vpJ
~·

not
7

intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy,

and that the search will be executed at a reasonable and

~~onvenient

v-?~6

I,.'U''

time.

15.

~
If

the~ject

·

of the search is to gather evidence

of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a
showing

of

probable

cause

to

believe

that

criminal

evidence will be found in the place to be searched.
evidence of

criminal activity

If

is discovered during the

course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized
under

the

"plain

Hampshire, 403

u.s.

may

to

be

used

view"

doctrine.

Coolidge

443, 465-66 (1971)

establish

probable

v.

New

This evidence then
cause

to

obtain

a

criminal search warrant.

Fire officials may not, however,

rely

to

on

this

evidence

expand

the

scope

administrative search without first making a
showing
officer.

of

probable

cause

to

an

independent

of

their

successful
judicial

16.

The object of

the search

exigent circumstances exist.

is

important even

if

Circumstances that justify a

warrantless search for the cause of a fire may not justify
a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that
cause

has

been

determined.

If,

for

example,

the

administrative search is justified by the immediate need
to ensure against rekindling, the scope of the search may
be no broader
end.

than

reasonably necessary to achieve

its

A search to gather evidence of criminal activity not

in plain view must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant
upon a traditional showing of probable cause.
The

searches

of

the

Clifford

~

horne,

at

least

arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed
search of

the basement area,

followed

by the extensive

search of the residential portion of the house.

We now

17.

apply

the

principles

outlined

above

to

each

of

these

searches.

IV

The Clifford home was a two-and-a-half story brick
and frame residence.

Although there was extensive damage

~

to the interior s

ure, the exterior of the house was

.1'1

~r--- ·~
by the firel

w c<..A

u~.•~ ..~

The firemen had broken out~

one of the doors and most of the windows in fighting the
blaze.

At

arrived,
belongings

the

the

time
home

remained,

~

Lieutenant

Beyer

and

his
But

partner
personal

was

uninhabitable.

and

Clifford had arranged to have

the house secured against intrusion in his absence.

Under

these circumstances, and in light of the especially strong

18.

expectations of

privacy connected with

a

home,

we

hold

that the Cliffords retained reasonable privacy interests
in

their

fire-damaged

investigations
Thus,
the

were

residence

subject

to

and

that

the

the warrant

post-fire

requirement.

the war rant less and nonconsensual searches of both

basement

and

the

upstairs

areas

of

the

house

were

valid only if exigent circumstances justified the object
and the scope of each.

A.

It

is not entirely clear whether

search of

the

basement was

determine

the

cause

evidence

of

arson.

of

the

an

the post-fire

administrative

fire

or

Respondents

a

search

contend

search

to

to gather
that

the

\.

,,,:•

19.

firefighters had made a preliminary investigation into the
cause

and

origin of

the

fire,

that

they had determined

J-

~ A. had

begun

in

the

basement,

and

identified its cause as probable arson.

that

they

had

They argue that

the sole purpose of Lieutenant Beyer's subsequent search
was to gather evidence of
argument,

the

State

the suspected arson.

conceded

that

the

At oral

firefighters

had

made a preliminary investigation and had determined that
arson

was

basement

likely.

Its

investigation

firefighters

had

position
some

departed

was

seems

six

to

hours

undertaken

be

that

after
for

a

the
the
dual

purpose - to determine the cause of the fire and to seize
evidence of arson.

Whatever its object at that time, this

search was subject to the warrant requirement.

As noted

above, the search of the basement was not made pursuant to

20.

either an administrative or a criminal warrant, and it was
not justified by exigent circumstances.
that

the

1:00

basement of

p.m.

We therefore hold

war rant less entry and

the Clifford

search of

the

residence did not comport with

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search
of

a

furniture

store,

despite

the

absence

of

exigent

circumstances, on the ground that it was a continuation of
a valid search begun immediately after the fire.
State

conceded

at

oral

argument,

this

As the
case

is

4 The search was made pursuant to a policy of the Arson
Divison that allowed nonconsensual warrantless entries
onto fire-damaged premises as long as they were made
within a reasonable time after the fire, the owner was not
present, and the premises were open to trespass.
This
policy did not attempt to identify exigent circumstances,
but focused more on the question whether there were
reasonable expectations of privacy in the premises.
As
applied here, the policy is not consistent with our
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.

21.

distinguishable.

In

investigation

into

flames

being

were

Tyler,

the

fire

cause

doused.

of

officials
the

That

1\

fire

as

their

the

last

investigation

was

but was completed ~

interrupted by smoke and darkness,

~~he~~ had

began

cleared and daylight had dawned.

Because the immediate post-fire search was interrupted for
only a short period of
evident,
more

we

than

held

an

that

time,

and

for

reasons that were

the early morning

actual continuation of

the

search was

"no

first,

the

and

lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure

of

evidence."

436

u.s.

at

511

This

case

is

was

not

a

distinguishable for several reasons.
First,

the

challenged

continuation of an earlier search.
his

partner

first

arrived

on

the

search

Lieutenant Beyer and
scene

to

begin

their

22.

investigation

six

hours

after

the

firefighters

extinguished the fire and left the scene.
the

Cliffords

had

taken

steps

to

had

In the interim,

secure

the

privacy

interests that remained in their private residence against
further intrusion.
to

extinguish

the

These efforts separate the entry made
blaze

investigate its origin.
the

Clifford

residence

from

that

made

later

to

Second, the privacy interests in
were

fire-damaged furniture store.

greater

than

those

in

the

Even apart from Clifford's

post-fire efforts to secure his home, the reasonableness
of the six hour delay in beginning the post-fire search is
more questionable than the reasonableness of the five hour
interruption of the search upheld in Tyler.5

These facts

L

5 Reasonable
expectations of
privacy
in
fire-damaged
premises will vary depending particularly on the type of
Footnote continued on next page.

,t.

·"'

~.

..

'

23.

the

two

separate

entries

and

the

heightened

privacy

interests in the home - distinguish this case from Tyler.
At least where a homeowner has taken significant steps to
secure

his

fire-damaged

home

after

the

blaze

has

been

extinguished and the fire and police units have left the
scene, we hold that a post-fire search must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of
some new . exigency. 6

So long as the primary purpose is to

building involved.
At one end of the spectrum is the
private residence, where reasonable expectations will be
particularly strong and where government intrusion should
be kept to a minimum.
See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
At the other
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as
commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much
that is personal or private.
A post-fire search that
covers a five hour span may be reasonable in the latter
but not in the former. Other considerations affecting the
reasonableness of a post-fire search in a particular type
of building 1\irf"e the scope of the search, the time of day
it is performed, the lapse of time between fire and
search, the extent of the fire damage, and the owner's
efforts to secure the building against intrusion.
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages.

24.

assertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant
will suffice.

B.

search

Because

the

of

upper

the

cause

of

portions

the
of

fire
the

~

was known,
J\
house,

the

described

above, could only have been a search to gather evidence of
the crime of arson.

Absent exigent circumstances, such a

search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a

6 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety. For
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an
apartment complex, the exigency exception may allow
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to
ensure against an immediate fire hazard.

C~-~

.2.~~~~

?t..~~tA..-~
h~~~
~ ?z..1~ ~~~
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25.

valid administrative search, it would not have justified
the

upstairs

search.

As

soon

as

the

investigators

determined that the fire had originated in the basement
and

had

been

caused

by

the

crock

pot

and

timer

found

beneath the basement stairs, the scope of their search was
limited to the basement area.

--

Although the investigators
~

.>

could have used whatever evidence they discovered in the
basement

to

establish

probable

cause

to

search

the

remainder of the house, they could not lawfully undertake
that search without a prior judicial determination that a
successful

showing

of

probable

cause

had

been

made.

Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the
upstairs

search,

and

it was undertaken without a prior

showing of probable cause before an independent judicial
officer,

we

hold

that

this

search

of

a

home

was

26.

unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
regardless of the validity of the basement search. 7

regions

The

warrantless

of

the

Clifford

intrusion

into

the

house

presents

a

upstairs
telling

illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of
proposed

administrative

searches.

An

administrative

search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire
officials licence to roam freely through the fire victim's

7 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating
the firefighters' investigation into the cause of a fire
from a search for evidence of arson. The distinction will
vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the
number of entries and re-entries. For example, once the
cause of a fire in a single-family dwelling is determined,
the adminsitrative search should end and any broader
investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal
warrant.
A fire in an apartment complex, on the other
hand, presents complexities that may make it necessary for
officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on
the premises for longer periods of time, and to make
repeated entries and re-entries into the building.
See
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510 n.6. Considerable latitude must be
given to the compelling state interest in thorough
investigations into the causes of recent fires.

i', ,l

27.

If an administrative warrant had been

private residence.
obtained
the

in

scope

of

this case,
the

it presumably would have 1 imi ted

proposed

prevented the warrantless

investigation

and

would

have

intrusion into the upper rooms

of the Clifford home.

v

The

only pieces of

physical

evidence

that have

been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three
empty fuel cans,

the electric crock pot, and a timer and

attached

Respondents

cord.

also

have

challenged

the

testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless
search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of

lZ..L~~ ·
the Clifford home. ~ JI'Wo of the fuel cans, the crock pot,

.

\

28.

.

~k.A.._

~

f

--

_... aA-.a-c.the timer and cord, a-nd/\ the investigators ~ testimony A were

~·Att-

J\

J4.-<_

~~.ae

r segv-ered eS .....a

~arch

no't?''-

reH~l \,.=A f ~ Re

unconstitutional post-fire

of the Clifford's residence.

Thus, we affirm that

portion of the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals
that

excluded

discovered

in

that

evidence.

plain

view

in

One of
the

Seizure of this evidence was proper.

the

fuel

Cliffords'

cans was
driveway.

To the extent that

the Michigan Court of Appeals excluded that evidence, we
reverse.

It is so ordered.

'

~

·•
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Rider A, p. 16 (Clifford)

CLIFFN SALLY-POW
Cammie:

I think it desirable at some appropriate place

(possibly keyed to the last sentence in the first full
paragraph on p. 16) , to add a note along the following
lines:

The plain-view doctrine must be applied in light
of the special circumstances that frequently accompany
fire damage.

In searching solely to ascertain the cause,

firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found.

At

the outset of such activities the evidence may not be, and
often is not, in "plain view" in the literal sense of that
Term.

,.

Rider A, p. 12 (Clifford)

lfp/ss 11/15/83
CLIFF12 SALLY-POW

Consider adding a footnote along the following lines:

We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire
normally remain within a building.
course, vary.

The circumstances, of

In many situations actual entry may be too

hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and
even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist.

Thus,

the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend
over a period of time with entry and reentry.

The

critical inquiry

object of the search

primarily is to

use whatever it may be,

rather

criminal conviction.

Potential Footnote

[The dissent argues that the 6 inches of water in the
basement hindered the post-fire investigation to the same extent
as did the smoke and darkness in Tyler and that the cases
therefore are indistinguishable.

We disagree.]

In Tyler, the

search began pursuant to the intial entry to fight the fire and
was completed within a reasonable time after the fire was
extinguished.

Because the interruption in the search was not

sufficient to separate the two entries, it fell within the
excigency created by the blaze itself.

In this case, there is no

evidence that the basement water interrupted any post-fire
search.

The fact that the 6 inches of water in the basement may

have prevented an immediate post-fire search if one had been
attempted is not determinative here.

The fact still remains that

between the time the blaze was extinguished and the investigators
finally entered to make their investigation, Clifford had taken
significant steps to secure his private residence.

'·Ji

.,

These

intervening circumstances were sufficient to manifest his
subjective expectations of privacy.

Because the property was a

horne, these expectations also were reasonable under any objective
test, and therefore were protected under the Fourth Amendment.

DRAFT OPINION (November 14, 1983)
Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357

POWELL, Associate Justice

This case presents questions as to the authority
of arson investigators,
circumstances
without

a

or

warrant

in the absence of either exigent

consent,
to

to

enter

investigate

a

private

the cause of

residence
a

recent

fire.

I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were
arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire

•

"·:'_\-II.

~-

2.

at

their

private

residence.

At

held

establish

probable

examination

alleged offense,

to

the

preliminary

cause

for

the

the State introduced various pieces of

physical evidence, most of which was obtained through a
warrantless

and

fire-damaged

nonconsensual

search

Respondents

horne.

of

moved

the

to

Clifford's

suppress

this

evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation
of

their

rights

Amendments.

under

the

Fourth

and

Fourteenth

That motion was denied and respondents were

bound over for trial.
suppress

the

Before trial, they again moved to

evidence obtained during

the

search.

The

Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied
that

motion

on

the

justified the search.

ground

that

exigent

circumstances

The court certified its evidentiary

3.

ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed.
That
circumstances
that

the

court

held

that

there

justifying the search.

warrantless

entry

and

were

no

Instead,

search of

exigent
it

found

the Clifford

residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson
Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned
such searches as long as the owner was not present, the
premises were open to trespass, and the search occur red
within

a

reasonable

Appeals

held

Mi c h i g an

v•

warrantless

(

l

residence

that
Ty 1 e r ,

time
this

their

Fourteenth Amendments.

the

policy

4 3 6 U• S •

nonconsensual
violated

of

was

49 9

search
rights

The

fire.

Court

inconsistent

( 19 7 8 ) ,
of
under

and

the
the

t h at

of

with
the

Cliffords'
Fourth

and

We granted certiorari to clarify

4.

\

doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our

L

decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a
fire erupted at the Clifford horne.
of

town on

a

camping

trip at

The Cliffords were out

the

time.

The fire was

reported to the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units
arrived

on

the

scene

around

5:42

a.m.

The

fire

was

extinguished and all fire officials and pol ice left the
premises at 7:04 a.m.
At
Lieutenant
section

of

instructions

.1,

... 1(

8:00

a.m.

Beyer,
the
to

a

on

fire

Detroit
investigate

the

morning

investigator
Fire
the

of

the

fire,

with

the

arson

Department,
Clifford

fire.

received
He was

5.

informed

that

the

Fire

Department

suspected

arson.

Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant Beyer did not
proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.

He and his

partner

fire

finally

arrived

at

the

scene of

the

about

1:00 p.m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the
scene.
water

The
out

crew was

boarding

up the

of

basement.

A

investigators

the
that

he

had

called

house and pumping

neighbor

Clifford

told

the

had

been

and

instructed to contact the Clifford insurance agent to send
a

boarding crew out to secure the house.

also

advised

that day.
be

pumped

that

the Cliffords did

The neighbor

not plan

to

return

While the investigators waited for the water to
out,

they

found

a

Coleman

fuel

can

in

the

driveway that was seized and marked as evidence. 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

•

'

...

1'

'

,

'

6.

By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without
obtaining consent or

an administrative warrant,

entered

the Clifford residence and began their investigation into
the cause of the fire.

Their search began in the basement

and they quickly discovered that the fire had originated
beneath

the

basement

stairway.

They detected

a strong

odor of fuel throughout the basement, and found two more
Coleman

fuel

cans

beneath

the

stairway.

As

they

dug

through the debris, the investigators also found a crock
pot with attached wires
that was plugged

leading

to an electrical timer

into an outlet a

few

feet

away.

The

1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire
officials who had fought the blaze. The firemen removed
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer
discovered it on his arrival.

7.

timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to
turn back off at approximately 9:00 a.m.
somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m.

It had stopped

All of this evidence

was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in
the

basement,

Lieutenant Beyer

the remainder of the house.
followed

was

extensive

and

and

his partner

searched

The warrantless search that
thorough.

The

investigators

called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the
house.

They

searched

through

found them full of old clothes.
and

noted

pictures.

that
They

there
found

were

drawers

closets

and

They inspected the rooms

nails

wiring

and

on
and

the

walls

but

no

cassettes

for

a

selectavision video tape machine but no machine.

,,

8.

Respondents

moved

to

excude

all

exhibits

and

testimony based on the basement and upstairs searches on
the ground that they were searches to gather evidence of
arson,

that

they

were

conducted

without

a

warrant,

consent, or exigent circumstances, and that they therefore
were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

Petitioner, on the other hand,

argues that

the entire search was reasonable and should be exempt from
the warrant requirement.

III

In

its petit ion for certiorari,

the State does

not challenge the state court's finding that there were no
exigent

circumstances

justifying

the

search

of

the

9.

Clifford

home.

Instead,

it

asks

us

to

exempt

from

the

warrant requirement all administrative investigations into
the cause and origin of a fire.

We decline to do so.

In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that
administrative searches generally

u.s.

at 504-508.

(1978);

Camara v.

require warrants.

See Marshall v.
Municipal Court,

Barlows,
387

u.s.

See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
that

view

defined

again

classes

today.
of

cases,

Except
the

in

u.s.

436
523

307

(1967);

We reaffirm

certain

nonconsensual

436

carefully
entry

and

search of property protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments

is unreasonable unless it has been authorized

by a valid warrant. 2

2 The Court has recognized the legality of warrantless
administrative
searches
in certain carefully defined
Footnote continued on next page.

10.

This

does

not,

however,

end

the

inquiry.

Th e

constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries
onto fire-damaged premises turns on several factors.
first

is

whether

there

are

any

legitimate

The

privacy

interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected
by the Fourth Amendment.

The second

is whether exigent

circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless
of any reasonable expectations of privacy.

The third is

whether the object of the search is to determine the cause
of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.

circumstances.
See, e.g., Donovon v. Dewey, 452 u.s. 594
(1981)
(heavily regulated business): United States v.
Biswell, 406 u.s. 311 (1972) (same): Colonnade v. United
States, 397 u.s. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
administrative warrant recognized in these cases are not
applicable to the warrantless search in this case.

'·

11.

A.

We

privacy

expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises.

"People

go

offices

on

living

after

private

a

effects

in

th~t

reasonable

may

observed

in

their

fire.
often

premises." Tyler, 436

Tyler

u.s.

Even

homes

or

when

remain
at 505

working

that

on

is

the

in

their

impossible,
fire-damaged

--~

4~ctations will

~I

vary with the type of property, the amount

of~damage,

the

prior and continued use of the premises, and in some cases
the owner's efforts to secure it against intruders.
fires

may

be

so devastating

that

no

reasonable

Some

privacy

interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the
owner's subjective expectations.

The test essentially is

an objective one: whether "the expectation

ris]

one that

12.

society is prepared to recognize as
v.

United

States,

concurring).
739-41
the

389

u.s.

347,

1

reasonable.
361

See also Smith v. Maryland,

(1979).

1

"

Katz

(Harlan,

J.,

u.s.

735,

442

If reasonable privacy interests remain in

fire-damaged

property,

the

requirement

warrant

applies, and any official entry must be made pursuant to a
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances.

B.

A burning building of course creates an exigency
that

justifies a

fight the blaze.

warrantless entry by fire officials to
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in

the building, officials need no warrant to remain for "a
reasonable

'·

time

to

investigate

the

cause

of

the

blaze

13.

after it has been extinguised." 436

u.s. at 510

Where,

however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the
fire-damaged

property,

additional

investigations

begun

after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police
officials

have

left

the

scene

generally

must

be

made

pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies
that will not

tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a

warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect firedamaged

premises. 3

Because

determining

the

cause

and

3 For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might
rekindle presents an exigency that would justify a
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation.
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence might be exempt from the warrant
requirement.

·· .

.·

14.

origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the
warrant requirement does not apply in such cases.

c.

If

a

warrant

is

necessary,

the object of

search determines the type of warrant required.

the

If the

object is to determine the cause and origin of a recent

/ fire,

w.U ~~C.:..

an

administrative

warrant

mtlst

be

•

obtatne~

To

obtain such a warrant, fire officials need show only that
a

fire

premises,

of

undetermined

that

the

scope

origin
of

has

the

occurred

proposed

on

search

the
is

reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire
victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at
a reasonable and convenient time.

'.•

15.

If the object of the search is to gather evidence
of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a
showing

of

probable

cause

evidence will be found
evidence

of

criminal

to

believe

that

criminal

in the place to be searched.
activity

is

discovered

during

If
the

course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized
under

-7

the

"plain

Hampshire, 403
may

be

used

to

443, 465-66

establish

(191{)

-

probable

Coolidge

v.

New

This evidence then
cause

to

obtain

a

Fire officials may not, however,

rely

to

on

showing
officer.

:!",

doctrine.

criminal search warrant.
this

administrative

·/

u.s.

view"

of

evidence
search

probable

expand

without
cause

to

first
an

the

scope

making

a

independent

of

their

successful
judicial

16.

The

object of

the

exigent circumstances exist.

search

is

important

even

if

Circumstances that justify a

warrantless search for the cause of a fire may not justify
a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that
cause

has

been

determined.

administrative search

is

If,

example,

for

the

justified by the immediate need

to ensure against rekindling, the scope of the search may
be

no

end.

broader

than

reasonably

necessary

to

achieve

its

A search to gather evidence of criminal activity not

in plain view must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant
upon a traditional showing of probable cause.
The

searches

of

the

Clifford

horne,

at

least

arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed
search

of

the

basement

area,

followed

search of

the

residential portion of

by

the

extensive

the house.

We now

17.

apply

the

principles

outlined

above

to

each

of

these

searches.

IV

The Clifford home was a two-and-a-half story brick
and frame residence.

Although there was extensive damage

to the interior structure, the exterior of the house was
largely undamaged by the fire.

The firemen had broken out

one of the doors and most of the windows in fighting the
blaze.

At

arrived,
belongings

the

the

time
home

Lieutenant
was

remained, and

Beyer

uninhabitable.

and

his
But

partner
personal

Clifford had arranged to have

the house secured against intrusion in his absence.

Under

these circumstances, and in light of the especially strong

..

~.

·:...

18.

expectations of

privacy connected

that the Cliffords retained
in

their

fire-damaged

investigations were
Thus,
the

a

home,

we

hold

reasonable privacy interests

residence

subject

with

to

and
the

that

the

warrant

post-fire

requirement.

the warrantless and nonconsensual searches of both

basement

and

the

upstairs

areas

of

the

house

were

valid only if exigent circumstances justified the object
and the scope of each.

A.

It
search of

.~

is not entirely clear whether
the

basement was

an

administrative

determine

the cause of

the

evidence

of

Respondents

arson •

the post-fire

fire

or

a

search

contend

search

to

to gather
that

the

19.

firefighters had made a preliminary investigation into the
cause
that

and
it

origin of
had

begun

the
in

fire,

the

that

they had determined

basement,

and

identified its cause as probable arson.

that

they

had

They argue that

the sole purpose of Lieutenant Beyer's subsequent search
was to gather evidence of the suspected arson.
argument,

the

State

conceded

that

the

At oral

firefighters

had

made a preliminary investigation and had determined that
arson

was

basement

likely.

Its

investigation

firefighters

had

position
some

departed

was

seems
six

to

hours

undertaken

be

that

after
for

a

the
the
dual

purpose - to determine the cause of the fire and to seize
evidence of arson.

Whatever its object at that time, this

search was subject to the warrant requirement.

As noted

above, the search of the basement was not made pursuant to

20.

either an administrative or a criminal warrant, and it was
not justified by exigent circumstances.
that

the

1:00 p.m.

basement of

We therefore hold

warrantless entry and

the Clifford

residence did

search of

the

not comport with

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search
of

a

furniture

~ircumstances,

store,
on the

State

conceded

the

ground~that

of a valid search begun
the

despite

at

absence

exigent

it was a continuation

immediately after
oral

of

argument,

the fire.

As

this

is

case

4 The search was made pursuant to a pol icy of the Arson
Divison that allowed nonconsensual warrantless entries
onto fire-damaged premises as long as they were made
within a reasonable time after the fire, the owner was not
present, and the premises were open to trespass.
This
policy did not attempt to identify exigent circumstances,
but focused more on the question whether there were
-ieiji~imat!~ expectations of privacy in the premises.
As
applied here, the policy is not consistent with our
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.

21.

distinguishable.

In

investigation

into

flames

being

were

Tyler,

the

fire

cause

doused.

officials

of

the

That

interrupted by smoke and darkness,
soon

as

the

began

fire

as

their

the

last

investigation

was

but was completed as

smoke had cleared and daylight

had dawned.

Because the immediate post-fire search was interrupted for
only a

short period of

evident,
more

we

than

held

an

that

time,

and

for

reasons that were

the early morning

actual continuation of

the

search was

"no

first,

the

and

lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure

of

evidence."

436

u.s.

at

511

This

case

is

was

not

a

distinguishable for several reasons.
First,

the

challenged

continuation of an earlier search.
his

partner

first

arrived

on

the

search

Lieutenant Beyer and
scene

to

begin

their

..

\

22.

;_.,_~~sh-oe)
~~ ix hours
the

fire

and

after the firefighters had extinguished

left

the

In

scene.

the

interim,

the

Cliffords had taken steps to secure the privacy interests
that remained in their private residence against further
intrusion.

These

efforts

separate

the

entry

made

to

extinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate
its origin.
residence
furniture

Second, the privacy interests in the Clifford
were

store.

reasonableness
post-fire

greater

of

search

than

those

in

the

fire-damaged

~t~~'%e~~4he ~
the
is

six

hour

more

delay

in

~

beginning

questionable

than

the

reasonableness of the five hour interruption of the search
upheld in Tyler. 5

These facts - the two separate entries

5Reasonable expectations of
privacy
in fire-damaged
premises will vary depending particularly on the type of
Footnote continued on next page.

(

~-"

.

't
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23.

and

the

heightened

distinguish

this

privacy

case

from

interests
Tyler.

At

in

the

least

home
where

a

homeowner has taken significant steps to secure his firedamaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a
post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant,
consent, or the identification of some new exigency.6

-/

So

building involved.
At one end of the spectrum is the
private residence, where reasonable expectations will be
particularly strong and where government intrusion should
be kept to a minimum.
See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445
u.s. 537, 589-90 (1980); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 ( 19~) .
At the other
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as
commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much
that is personal or private.
A post-fire search that
covers a five hour span may be rea.sonable in the latter
bu t no ~ in the former. D~ ~rF?:
·
.t. IVI...t..Lc..l-~"1(~

{\ ~ ~-fi;J-'4.1"'

cJ.....J

W-

~ f ~c.u.l.tfcA. -h..rP.-L iJ.

d.f\.

V Y~

t6 This is not to suggest that inaJ.Ovid~
exp~ ctations of
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety. For
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an
apartment complex,
the exigency exception may allow
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary
ensure against an immediate fire hazard.
~
~

..

~:

24.

long as the primary purpose is to assertain the cause of
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.

B.

search

Because

the

of

upper

the

cause

of

the

portions

of

fire
the

was

known,

house,

the

described

above, could only have been a search to gather evidence of
the crime of arson.

Absent exigent circumstances, such a

search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a
valid administrative search,

it would not have justified

the

soon

upstairs

search.

As

as

the

investigators

determined that the fire had originated in the basement
and

had

been caused

by

the crock

pot

and

timer

found

·.,

'

.

.,

25.

beneath the basement stairs, the scope of their search was
limited to the basement area.

Although the investigators

could have used whatever evidence they discovered in the
basement

to

establish

probable

cause

to

search

the

remainder of the house, they could not lawfully undertake
that search without a prior judicial determination that a
successful

showing

of

probable

cause

had

been

made.

Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the
upstairs

search,

and

it was undertaken without a prior

showing of probable cause before an independent judicial
officer,

we

hold

that

this

search

of

a

horne

was

unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
regardless of the validity of the basement search. 7

7 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating
the firefighters' investigation into the cause of a fire
Footnote continued on next page •

....~.·.1.
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regions

The

warrantless

of

the

Clifford

intrusion

into

the

house

presents

a

upstairs
telling

illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of
proposed

administrative

searches.

An

administrative

search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire
officials licence to roam freely through the fire victim's
private residence.

If an administrative warrant had been

obtained in this case,

it presumably would have 1 imi ted

from a search for evidence of arson. The distinction will
vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the
number of entries and re-entries. For example, once the
cause of a fire in a single-family dwelling is determined,
the adminsitrative search should end and any broader
investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal
warrant.
A fire in an apartment complex, on the other
hand, presents complexities that may make it necessary for
officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on
the premises for longer periods of time, and to make
repeated entries and re-entries into the building.
See
Tyler, 436 u.s. at 510 n.6. Considerable latitude mustt>"e
given to the compelling state interest in thorough
investigations into the causes of recent fires.

27.

the

scope of

prevented

the

proposed

the warrantless

of the Clifford

investigation

and

would

have

intrusion into the upper rooms

hom~.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence

that have

been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three
empty fuel cans,

the electric crock pot, and a timer and

attached

Respondents

cord.

also

have

challenged

the

testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless
search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of
the Clifford home.

Two of the fuel cans, the crock pot,

the timer and cord, and the investigators' testimony were
discovered as a

result of the unconstitutional post-fire

.

'

28.

search of the Clifford's residence.

Thus, we affirm that

portion of the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals
that

excluded

discovered

in

that

evidence.

plain

view

in

One of
the

Seizure of this evidence was proper.

the

fuel

Cliffords'

cans was
driveway.

To the extent that

the Michigan Court of Appeals excluded that evidence, we
reverse.

It is so ordered.
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DRAFT OPINION (November 16, 1983)
Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357

POWELL, Associate Justice

This case presents questions as to the authority
of arson investigators,
circumstances
without

a

or

warrant

in the absence of either exigent

consent,
to

to

enter

investigate

a

private

the cause of

residence
a

recent

fire.

I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were
arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire

2.

at

their

private

residence.

At

held

establish

probable

examination

alleged offense,

to

the

preliminary

cause

for

the

the State introduced various pieces of

physical evidence, most of which was obtained through a
warrantless

and

fire-damaged

nonconsensual

search

Respondents

horne.

of

moved

the

to

Clifford's

suppress

this

evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation
of

their

rights

Amendments.

under

the

Fourth

and

Fourteenth

That motion was denied and respondents were

bound over for trial.
suppress

the

Before trial, they again moved to

evidence obtained during

the

search.

The

trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied
the

motion

on

the

justified the search.

ground

that

exigent

circumstances

The court certified its evidentiary

3

ruling for

0

interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court of

Appeals reversed.
That
circumstances
that

the

court

held

that

justifying

warrantless

the

entry

there

no

Instead,

search.
and

were

search

of

exigent
it

the

found

Clifford

residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson
Division

of

the Detroit Fire Department

such searches as

long as

premises were open
within

a

Appeals
Michigan

reasonable
held
v.

warrantless
residence

to

that
Tyler,

time
this

U.S.

their

Fourteenth Amendments.

of

and

the

policy

nonconsensual
violated

sanctioned

the owner was not present, the

trespass,

436

that

The

fire.
was

499
search

rights

the search occur red
Court

inconsistent

(1978),
of
under

and

the
the

We granted certiorari

that

of

with
the

Cliffords'
Fourth

and

to clarify

4.

doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our
decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a
fire erupted at the Clifford home.
of

town

on

a

reported

to

the Detroit Fire Department,

arrived

on

extinguished

camping

the

trip

scene

at

all

fire

and

at

The Cliffords were out

about

the

time.

5:42

a.m.

The
and

fire

was

fire units

The

fire

officials and pol ice

was

left the

premises at 7:04 a.m.
At
Lieutenant
section

of

instructions

8:00

a.m.

Beyer,
the
to

a

on

fire

Detroit
investigate

the

morning

investigator
Fire
the

of

the

fire,

with

the

arson

Department,
Clifford

fire.

received
He

was

5.

informed

that

the

Fire

Department

suspected

arson.

Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant Beyer did not
proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.

He and his

partner

fire

finally

arrived

at

the

scene of

the

about

1:00 p.m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the
scene.

The

crew was

boarding up the house and pumping

some six inches of water out of the basement.

A neighbor

told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had
been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent
to send

a

boarding crew out

to secure

the house.

The

neighbor also advised that the Cliffords did not plan to
return that day.
water

While the investigators waited for

the

to be pumped out, they found a Coleman fuel can in

the driveway that was seized and marked as evidence. 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

6.

By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without
obtaining consent or an administrative warrant,

entered

the Clifford residence and began their investigation into
the cause of the fire.

Their search began in the basement

and they quickly discovered that the fire had originated
beneath

the

basement

stairway.

They detected

a strong

odor of fuel throughout the basement, and found two more
Coleman

fuel

cans

beneath

the

stairway.

As

they

dug

through the debris, the investigators also found a crock
pot with attached wires
that was plugged

leading to an electrical timer

into an outlet a

few

feet away.

The

1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire
officials who had fought the blaze. The firemen removed
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer
discovered it on his arrival.

7.

timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to
turn back off at approximately 9:00 a.m.
somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m.

It had stopped

All of this evidence

was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in
the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched
the remainder of the house.
followed

was extensive and

The warrantless search that
thorough.

The

investigators

called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the
house.

They

searched

through

found them full of old clothes.
and

noted

pictures.

that

there

They found

were

drawers

and

and

They inspected the rooms

nails

on

the

wiring and cassettes

tape machine but no machine.

closets

walls
for

but

no

a video

8.

Respondents

moved

to

excude

all

exhibits

and

testimony based on the basement and upstairs searches on
the ground that they were searches to gather evidence of
arson,

that

they

were

conducted

without

a

warrant,

consent, or exigent circumstances, and that they therefore
were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

Petitioner, on the other hand,

argues that

the entire search was reasonable and should be exempt from
the warrant requirement.

III

In

its petition for certiorari,

the State does

not challenge the state court's finding that there were no
exigent

circumstances

justifying

the

search

of

the

9.

Clifford

home.

Instead,

it

asks

us

to

exempt

from

the

warrant requirement all administrative investigations into
the cause and origin of a fire.

We decline to do so.

In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that
administrative

searches generally

u.s. at 504-508.
307

(1978):

(1967):

require warrants.

436

See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.

Camara

v.

Municipal

Court,

See v. City of Seattle, 387 u.s.

reaffirm

that

view

carefully

defined

again

classes

today.
of

cases, 2

387
541

Except
the

u.s.
(1967).

in

523
We

certain

nonconsensual

entry and search of property is governed by the warrant

2 see e.g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 u.s. 594 (1981) (heavily
regulated business): United States v. Biswell, 406 u.s.
311 (1972) (same): Colonnade v. United States, 397 u.s. 72
(1970)
(same).
The exceptions to the administrative
warrant recognized in these cases are not applicable to
the warrantless search in this case.

10.

requirement of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The

constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries
onto fire-damaged premises, therefore, normally turns on
several

factors:

whether

there

are

legitimate

privacy

interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected
by

the

justify

Fourth
the

reasonable

Amendment:
government

expectations

whether

exigent

intrusion
of

privacy:

circumstances

regardless
and,

of

any

whether

the

object of the search is to determine the cause of the fire
or to gather evidence of criminal activity.

A.

We

..

"

observed

in

Tyler

that

reasonable

privacy

expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises.

"People

11.

may

go

offices

on

living

after

private

a

homes

Even

often

Tyler,

will vary with

their

fire.

effects

premises."

in

when

remain

436 U.S.

or

working

that
on

at 505

is

the

in

their

impossible,
fire-damaged

Privacy expectations

the type of property, the amount of fire

damage, the prior and continued use of the premises, and
in

some

cases

intruders.

the owner 1 s

Some

fires

efforts

may

be

to secure

so

it against

devastating

that

no

reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins,
regardless
test

of

the

essentially

owner 1 s

subjective

is

objective

an

expectations.
one:

whether

The
"the

expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize
as
361

1

reasonable.
(1967)

Maryland,

1

"

(Harlan,
442

u.s.

Katz
J.,

735,

v.

United States,

concurring).
739-41

389 U.S.

347,

See also Smith v.

(1979).

If

reasonable

.:

12.

privacy interests remain in the fire-damaged property, the
warrant requirement applies, and any official entry must
be

made

pursuant

to

a

warrant,

consent,

or

exigent

circumstances.

B.

A burning building of course creates an exigency
that

justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to

fight the blaze.

Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in

the building, officials need no warrant to remain 3 for "a

3we do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally
remain within a building. The circumstances, of course,
vary.
In many situations actual entry may be too
hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and
even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend
over a period of time with entry and re-entry.
The
critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of
Footnote continued on next page.

13.

reasonable

time

to

investigate

the

after it has been extinguished." 436

cause of

u.s.

the

at 510.

blaze
Where,

however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the
fire-damaged

,

property,

additional

investigations

begun

after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police
officials

have

left

the

scene,

generally must

be made

pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies
that will not

tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a

warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect firedamaged

premises. 4

Because

determining

the

cause

and

privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular
time, and if so, whether exigencies justify the reentries.
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages.

'·

•·;,

14.

origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the
warrant requirement does not apply in such cases.

c.

If

a

warrant

is

necessary,

the object of

search determines the type of warrant required.

the

If the

primary object is to determine the cause and origin of a
recent fire,

an administrative warrant will suffice.

To

obtain such a warrant, fire officials need show only that
a

fire

of

undetermined

origin

has

occurred

on

the

4 For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might
rekindle presents an exigency that would justify a
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation.
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant
requirement.

15.

premises,

that

the

scope

of

the

proposed

search

is

reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire
victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at
a reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather
evidence of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained
only

on

a

criminal
searched.

showing

evidence

of

probable

will

be

cause

to

in

the

found

believe
place

that
to

be

If evidence of criminal activity is discovered

during the course of a valid administrative search, it may
be seized under the "plain view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,

403 U.S.

443,

465-466

(1971).

This evidence

then may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a

't

criminal search warrant.

Fire officials may not, however,

rely

to

on

this

evidence

expand

the

scope

of

their

16.

administrative search without first making a
showing

of

probable

cause

to

an

independent

successful
judicial

officer.
The object of

the search

exigent circumstances exist.

is

important even

if

Circumstances that justify a

warrantless search for the cause of a fire may not justify
a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that
cause

has

been

determined.

If,

for

example,

the

administrative search is justified by the immediate need
to ensure against rekindling, the scope of the search may
be no broader
end.

than

reasonably necessary to achieve

its

A search to gather evidence of criminal activity not

in plain view must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant
upon a traditional showing of probable cause. 5

Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages.

17.

The

searches

of

the

Clifford

horne,

at

least

arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed
search of

the basement area,

followed

by the extensive

search of the residential portion of the house.
apply

the

principles

outlined

above

to

each

We now
of

these

two-and-one-half

story

searches.

IV

The

Clifford

horne

brick and f rarne residence.

was

a

Although there was extensive

5The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the
special circumstances that frequently accompany fire
damage.
In searching solely to ascertain the cause,
f irernen custornar ily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At
the outset of such activities the evidence may not be, and
often is not, in "plain view" in the literal sense of that
term .

. :"·

18.

damage to the lower
the

house

and

undamaged
damage.

by

interior structure, the exterior of

some of
the

the

fire,

upstairs

although

rooms were

there

was

largely

some

smoke

The firemen had broken out one of the doors and

most of the windows in fighting the blaze.
Lieutenant Beyer and his partner arrived,
uninhabitable.

At the time
the horne was

But personal belongings remained, and the

Cliffords had arranged to have the house secured against
intrusion
and

in

in their
light

of

absence.
the

Under

strong

these ci rcurnstances,

expectations

of

privacy

connected with a horne, we hold that the Cliffords retained
reasonable
residence

privacy
and

that

interests
the

in

post-fire

subject to the warrant requirement.

their

fire-damaged

investigations

were

Thus, the warrantless

and nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the

..

I

19.

upstairs areas of

the house were valid only if exigent

circumstances justified the object and the scope of each.

A.

As noted, the State does not claim that exigent
circumstances
basement.

justified

its

post-fire

search

of

the

The State argues that we should either exempt

post-fire searches from the warrant requirement or modify
Tyler to justify the warrantless search in this case.

We

have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to
its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search
of

a

furniture

store,

despite

the

absence

of

exigent

circumstances, on the ground that it was a continuation of

.•

'.

20.

a

valid

search

begun

immediately

investigation

was

begun

doused,

was

interrupted

but

as

the

after

last
by

the

flames

smoke

and

fire.

The

were

being

darkness.

Nevertheless, the search was completed promptly after the
smoke cleared and daylight dawned.
post-fire search was
of time, and for
the

early

Because the immediate

interrupted for

a reasonable period

reasons that were evident, we held that

morning

search

was

"no

more

than

an

actual

continuation of the first, and the lack of a warrant thus
did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evidence." 436

u.s.

at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case

is

..
',,

distinguishable

challenged

search

search.

Between

for

was

not

the

several
a

reasons.

continuation

time

the

First,
of

an

the

earlier

firefighters

had

21.

extinguished the blaze and left the scene and the arson
investigators first arrived to begin their investigation,
the

Cliffords

had

taken

steps

to

secure

the

privacy

interests that remained in their residence against further
intrusion.

These

efforts

separate

the

entry

made

to

extinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate
its

origin.

Second,

the

privacy

interests

in

the

residence - particularly after the Cliffords had acted were significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged
furniture

store,

making

the

six-hour

delay

between the

fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant,
consent,

or

exigent circumstances.

We

frequently have

noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a
private residence. 6

These facts - the interim efforts to

Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages.

'•

22.

secure the burned-out premises and the heightened privacy
interests in the home - distinguish this case from Tyler.
At least where a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to
secure

his

fire-damaged

home

after

the

blaze

has

been

extinguished and the fire and police units have left the
scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire search must be
conducted

pursuant

identification

of

to

some

a
new

warrant,
exigency. 7

consent,
So

long

or
as

the
the

6 see e.g. Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 537, 589-90
(1980); United States v. United States District Court, 407
u.s. 297, 313 (1972).
Reasonable expectations of privacy
in fire-damaged premises will vary depending particularly
on the type of building involved.
At one end of the
spectrum is the private residence,
where reasonable
expectations
will
be
particularly
strong
and
where
government intrusion should be kept to a minimum.
At the
other end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such
as commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain
much that is personal or private.
7 This

is not to suggest that individual expectations of
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety.
For
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an
apartment complex,
the exigency exception may allow
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to
Footnote continued on next page •

.
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primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an
administrative warrant will suffice.

B.

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the
search

of

the

upper

portions

of

the

house,

described

above, could only have been a search to gather evidence of
the crime of arson.

Absent exigent circumstances, such a

search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a
valid administrative search,
the

upstairs

search.

The

it would not have justified
scope

of

such

a

search

is

ensure against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.

24.

limited
cause

to

that

and

origin

rekindling.
the

fire

caused

reasonably
a

fire

and

to

to

determine
ensure

the

against

As soon as the investigators determined that

had

by

of

necessary

originated

the

crock

in

pot

the

and

basement

timer

found

and

had

been

beneath

the

basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area.

Although the investigators could have

used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause
house,

they

could

without a prior
showing of
were

no

search,

not

lawfully

undertake

that

search

judicial determination that a successful

probable

exigent

to search the remainder of the

cause had been made.

circumstances

justifying

Because there
the

upstairs

and it was undertaken without a prior showing of

probable cause before an independent judicial officer, we

25.

hold that this search of a horne was unreasonable under the
Fourth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments,

regardless

of

the

validity of the basement search. 8

regions

The

warrantless

of

the

Clifford

intrusion

into

the

house

presents

upstairs
a

telling

illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of
proposed
warrant

administrative
had

been

searches.

obtained

in

this

If

an adrninistrat i ve

case,

it

presumably

8 In many cases, there wi 11 be no bright 1 ine separating
the firefighters' investigation into the cause of a fire
from a search for evidence of arson. The distinction will
vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the
number of entries and re-entries.
For example, once the
cause of a fire in a single-family dwelling is determined,
the administrative search should end and any broader
investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal
warrant.
A fire in an apartment complex, on the other
hand, may present complexities that make it necessary for
officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on
the premises for longer periods of time, and to make
repeated entries and re-entries into the building.
See
Tyler, 436 u.s. at 510 n.6. Considerable latitude must be
given to the compelling state interest in thorough
investigations into the causes of recent fires.

26.

would have limited the scope of the proposed investigation
and

would

the upper

have prevented

the warrantless

rooms of the Clifford horne.

intrusion

into

An administrative

search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire
officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's
private residence.

v

The

only pieces of

physical

evidence

that

have

been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three
empty fuel cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and
attached

cord.

Respondents

also

have

challenged

the

testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless
search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of

,~

.

',

tc''

27.

the Clifford horne.
the

crock

pot,

The discovery of two of the fuel cans,

the

timer

and

cord

as

well

as

the

investigators' related testimony -were the product of the
unconstitutional
residence.
of

the

view

in

plain

search

of

the

Clifford's

Thus, we affirm that portion of the judgment

Michigan

evidence.

post-fire

Court

One of the
the

view

firefighters.

Appeals

that

excluded

fuel cans was discovered

Cliffords'
during

of

driveway.

the

It would

intial
have

that

in plain

This can was
investigation

seen
by

been admissible whether

in
the
it

had been seized in the basement by the firefighters or in
the

driveway

by

the

arson

investigators.

Exclusion

of

this evidence should be reversed.

It is so ordered.

'.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of ~r exigent circumstances
or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to
investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a.m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a.m.
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p.m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.

82-357-0PINION
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD

3

While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly ~ that the fire had originatedl'beneath the .
basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a.m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30a.m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to excude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.

/./ _ . _
~
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tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search was
reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.

A
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
See e. g. Donovon v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
administrative warrant recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.
2
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Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505 Privacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testessentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
1--t.L
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warran~ 1..-iAconse~ or exigent circumstances.
~ ~

G

B
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
3
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The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a showing of probable cais'e to believe that cri~nal evidence will be
found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 465-466
(1971). This evidence then may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials
may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the scope
of their administrative search without first making a successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial
officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
' For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
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search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant to a
criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 5
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy ~d with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
5
The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view" in the
literal sense of that term.
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nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house,._we!'e valid only if exigent circumstances justified the object and the scope of each.
fi.

A

As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire search" of.tH.e basemeat. ~
.s.
J f A~ argues that we ~feithe~exempt post-fire searches
from the warrant requirement or modify Tyler to justify the
s warrantless search" in this case. We have rejected the
State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but<\~
·,
smoke and darkness . .....)'ffl:~,< ertll~lesst _pie search w~
~ A~ promptly after the smoke c1eared and daylight
dawned. Because th ~eaiat~post-fire search was interrupted.(Mt a rea~onssle ~eriGa ef -time, a"Adlfor reasons that
. . . .~ere evident, we held that the early morning search was "no
more than an actual continuation of the first, and the lack of a
warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evidence. " 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the_ ~!
scene and the arson investigators first arrivedJ o begin their
investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate its
origin. Second, the privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store, mak-

I P/11
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ing the six-hour delay between the fire and the mid-day
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence. 6 These
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or
the identification of some new exigency. 7 So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasons See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations will be pal'tiel:l:lePly,..,----strong and where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At
the other end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or
private.
7
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.

~
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ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 8
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad8

In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment eemp!Qx, on the other hand, may present complexities
that make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to
remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated
entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S. at 510 n. 6.
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires .
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ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Clifford's residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in the
basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the arson
investigators.
Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD ET AL.
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No. 82---357.
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Respondents' private residence was damaged by an early morning fire
while they were out of town. Firefighters extinguished the blaze at 7:04
a.m., at which time all fire officials and police left the premises. Five
hours later, a team of arson investigators arrived at the residence for the
first time to investigate the cause of the blaze. They found a work crew
on the scene boarding up the house and pumping water out of the basement. The investigators learned that respondents had been notified of
the fire and had instructed their insurance agent to send the crew to secure the house. Nevertheless, the investigators entered the residence
and conducted an extensive search without obtaining either consent or
an administrative warrant. Their search began in the basement where
they found two Coleman fuel cans and a crock pot attached to an electrical timer. The investigators determined that the fire had been caused
by the crock pot and timer and had been set deliberately. After seizing
and marking the evidence found in the basement, the investigators extended their search to the upper portions of the house where they found
additional evidence of arson. Respondents were charged with arson and
moved to suppress all the evidence seized in the warrantless search on
the ground that it was obtained in violation of their rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Michigan trial court denied
the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the
search. On interlocutory appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals found
that no exigent circumstances existed and reversed.
Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
J USTICE POWELL, joined by JUSTICE BRENNAN, J USTICE WHITE , and
J USTICE MARSHALL, concluded that where reasonable expectations of
privacy remain in fire-damaged premises, administrative searches into
the cause and origin of a fire are subject to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment absent consent or exigent circumstances.

II

MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD
Syllabus
There are especially strong expectations of privacy in a private residence
and respondents here retained significant privacy interests in the their
fire-damaged home. Because the warrantless search of the basement
and upper areas of respondents' home was authorized ?either by consent
nor exigent circumstances, the evidence seized in that search was obtained in violation of respondents' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and must be suppressed. Pp. 4-11.
(a) Where a warrant is necessary to search fire-damaged premises,
an administrative warrant suffices if the primary object of the search is
to determine the cause and origin of the fire, but a criminal search warrant, obtained upon a showing of probable cause, is required if the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of criminal activity. Pp.
4-7.
(b) The search here was not a continuation of an earlier search, and
the privacy interests in the residence made the delay between the fire
and the midday search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, distinguished.
Because the cause of the fire was lrnown upon search of the basement,
the search of the upper portions of the house could only have been a
search to gather evidence of arson requiring a criminal warrant absent
exigent circumstances. Even if the basement search had been a valid
administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs search,
since as soon as it had been determined that the fire originated in the
basement, the scope of the search was limited to the basement area.
Pp. 8-11.
JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that the search of respondents' home was
unreasonable in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because the investigators made no effort to provide fair advance notice of the inspection to respondents. A nonexigent, forceful, warrantless entry cannot
be reasonable unless the investigator has made some effort to give the
owner significant notice to be present while the investigation is made.
Pp. fr7.

POWELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEVENS,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. REHNQUIST, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
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MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD
AND EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MICHIGAN
[November - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as tQ.{~uthority of arson
investigators, in the absence of~igent circumstances
or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to
investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a.m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a.m.
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p.m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
~
the fire. Their search began in the basement and the
·~.~~~----..,q=
m~cT:Tki~.Qisee•rere~that the fire had originated eneath the
basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a.m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30a.m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
/ and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
v/
Respondents moved to exc.pde all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-

rf

' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.
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tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search was
reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
2

j

See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon~
-~r::!..._~~~}!,~~~~~ States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
~warran~recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in tnis case.
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Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 5050 Pri(;)
vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testessentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies~
- ~
_,JRd any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant
~
tH
consent~gent circumstances.
()..,- ~ CL- D

J

B
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectation's
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
3
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The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

!

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire an a
trative warrant will suffice. To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
cr1mma activity, a arrant may eo ame on yon as owing of probable cau e to believe that et"iminM: ev1 ence WI e
found in the place to be searched. If eviden e of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 465-466
(1971). This evidence then may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials
may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the scope
of their administrative search without first making a successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial
officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
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search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant to a
criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
Vcaus~ ~
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
these circumstances and in light of the strong expectations
p-----....---:--'th a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained asonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and

~ Ahe plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view" in the
literal sense of that term.
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nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the
stairs areas of the house ~ va 1d only if exigent circums ances ·ustified the object an the scope of each.
A

As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumost-fire search
UL ~
~ ~lrgues that we should either exempt post-fire searches
from the warrant requirement or modify Tyler to justify the
~rrantless searchSin this case. We have rejected the
.
State's first argume~t and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but
lfttef'f'l:lptea a#=
smoke and darkness. Ne verifieli~ ;:)lie search was eem.1'-----=~:-::-::r• romptly after the s~ cleared and daylight
dawn . Because the immeaiatClpost-fire search was interrupted fop a FeaseRable peFioa af time, aru1'1or reasons that
were evident, we held that the early morning search was "no
more than an actual continuation of the first, and the lack of a
warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a •continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrivedi to begin their
investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate its
origin. Second, the privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store, mak~

~s justified its

rwas
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ing the
delay between the fire and the mid-day
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence:::: These
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire
search must be conducted pursuant to a ~arrant, consent, or
the identification of some new exigencr.... So long as the pri- <[>
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause ofthe fire, an adminis- "
trative warrant will suffice.

"

B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-

*"} /see e.

g. Payton v. N ew York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations vnll ee f'!triieYlaFly--9-A ~
strong and where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At
the other end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or
private.
~ ,/'rhis is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
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ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
flylendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search~q

The wariantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-

/

,•

'1

/ In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment~ the other hand , may present complexities
that make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to
remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated
entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S_;, at 51 ~ n. 6.
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires.
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ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
pr~uct of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
liffor ' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgme of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in the
basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the arson
investigators.
Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD
AND EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MICHIGAN
[November-, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied andrespondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42a.m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a.m.
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p.m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a.m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30a.m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.

('
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tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search was
reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
2
See e. g. Donovon v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.

82-357-0PINION
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD

5

Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Privacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testessentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant, in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
3
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
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The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 6 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view'' doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
scope of their administrative search without first making a
• For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
6
Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See
Tyler, 436 U. S., at 508; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 538.
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successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant to a
criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the ·blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
'"'- the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
6

The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view'' in the
literal sense of that term.
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of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would havew been valid only if exigent circumstances had justified the object and the scope of
each.
A
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum- e_
stances justified its post-fire searchs. It argues that we A
either should exempt post-fire search~ from the warrant requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00
p.m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later
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to investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises
.and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or "
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 58~90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations are strong and
where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At the other
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or private.
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
7
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Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6.
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires.
9

J
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-it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would h~ve prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vicJ tim's private residence.

v

_

; The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chalon this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in the
basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the arson
investigators.
Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances ·or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. · The court certified its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
·justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.

n,
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords .were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m.
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason1
The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth' Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
2
See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Privacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and contiimed use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testessentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
3
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
' For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
5
Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See
Tyler, 436 U. S. , at 508; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 538.
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scope of their administrative search without first making a
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view" in the
literal sense of that term.
6
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each.
A
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 p.
m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps
to secure the privacy interests that remained in their residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate the
entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later to
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investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations are strong and
where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At the other
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or private.
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
7
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Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
9

In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand , may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6.
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires.
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it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. · The court certified its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.

1.)
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.

II•
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m.
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence.'
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason1

The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth' Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A

We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
' See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Privacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testessentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
3
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. l Smnlarlf, a post-ure searcli ::maae::t~n
the imminent deitruoti~£-e¥4denee may ee eKsmpt-from-the-w~CU41<.-'
~ent.-5 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See
Tyler, 436 U. S., at 508· amara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 538.
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scope of their administrative search without first making a
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires E_e like! to be fou
t the outset o! such
activities the evidence may:.?ot hey-and-o en isno , m p am Vlew" m " e
~
~ ~ ...J.--ka..Jliteral sense of that term.
6

t _fl--

~ ~ -y~ ~9 ~c,l.._ ~ ~o...A~

~~1M- ~'-41 ~

a_

J

wtJJ-z~
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each.
A

As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about ~
m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps
to secure the privacy interests that remained in their residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate the
entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later to

.. '
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investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason)1-----'-able ex ectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending Q..__
_
particularly on the type ef building involved.
one en o e spectrum
is fhe pnvate~dence, w ere reasona le expectation
trong- and
ep o a minimum. At the other
where government intrusion ..s
~trum are commercial structures, such as commercial wareend
ous
nlikel to contain much that is personal or privateJ]==-- ---J
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations Qfprivacy
y
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
7
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Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
9
In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S. , at 510, n. 6.
iderable latitude-must be-given to the--oompelling state interest ·n
rough investig:ations-in~s. __.(._·_ __

e___
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it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer. and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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Justice Rehnquist

Circulated: -'-=~-'-#/~+--"'-=-----Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES
No. 82-357
MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD
AND EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MICHIGAN
[December - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
Six Terms ago in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978),
we first addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause to the activities of fire fighters and
inspectors following a fire at a warehouse. A divided Court
held that the fire itself was an "exigent circumstance" which
allowed entry to extinguish the fire and authorized investigators to remain for a reasonable time to investigate the cause
of the blaze. I d., at 509-510. We also held that a "re-entry" a few hours after these officials had departed was an "actual continuation" of the earlier investigation, but that subsequent visits more than three weeks after the fire required an
administrative warrant. I d., at 511. These precepts of Tyler have not proved easy to apply, and we are told in the
Court's opinion in this case that "we granted certiorari to
clarify doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our
decision in Tyler." Ante, at 2. But that same opinion demonstrates beyond peradventure that if that was our purpose,
we have totally failed to accomplish it; today's opinion, far
from clarifying the doubtful aspects of Tyler, sows confusion
broadside. I would hold that the "exigent circumstances"
doctrine enunciated in Tyler authorized the search of the
basement of the Clifford home, although the remaining parts
of the house could not have been searched without the issuance of a warrant issued upon probable cause.
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Judging simply by comparison of these facts to those in Tyler, I believe that the basement inspection conducted by Lt.
Beyer about 1:30 p.m. on October 18th-some six hours after
the fire was extinguished and the fire officials and police had
left the Clifford premises-was an "actual continuation" of
the original entry to fight the fire, as that term is used in Tyler. The fire fighters who fought the blaze at the Clifford
house had removed a can containing Coleman lantern fuel and
placed it in the driveway of the home, where it was later
seized and marked as evidence by the inspectors who arrived
about 1:00 p.m. Thus here, as in Tyler, the investigation
into the cause of the fire went on contemporaneously with the
efforts to fight it, before the fire fighters first left the
premises in the early morning. I see no reason to treat the
six-hour delay between the departure of the fire fighters and
the arrival of the investigators in this case any differently
than the Court treated the five-hour delay between the departure of the investigators at 4:00 a.m. from the Tyler warehouse and their return to the same premises at 9:00 a.m.
The Court seeks to distinguish the two situations on the
basis of differences which seem to me both trivial and immaterial. It says that in that interim in our case, the Cliffords
"had taken steps to secure their privacy interests that remained in their residence against further intrusion." Ante,
at 8. While this may go to the question of whether or not
there was an invasion of a privacy interest amounting to a
search, it has no bearing on the question of whether there
were exigent circumstances which constitute an exception to
the warrant requirement for what is concededly a search.
The Court also intimates that the "fire fighters" did nothing
but fight the fire, and that the arson investigation did not begin until the arson investigators arrived at 1:00 in the afternoon. Ante, at 8-9. But fire fighting and fire investigation
are obviously not this neatly compartmentalized, as is shown
by the fact that the fire fighters themselves had removed the
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Coleman lantern fuel can for ins ction by the later team f
';}...;
arson investigators.
~
The Court also purports to distinguish the facts in Tyler by
the statement that "the privacy interests in the residenceparticularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store. . . . "
Ante, at 9. But if the furniture store in Tyler is to be characterized as "fire damaged," surely the Clifford's residence
deserves the same characterization; it too was "fire-damaged." It is also well-e.stablished that private commerciam
buildings in this context a~~~much J2!:._0tect~ bY.,the Fourth
Amendment as are private wellings. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 542-543 (1967) (citing cases). And certainly the public interest in determining the cause and origin
of a fire in a commercial establishment applies with equal, if
not greater, force to the necessity of determining the cause
and origin of a fire in a home.
On the authority of Tyler, therefore, I would uphold the
search of the Clifford basement and allow use of the evidence
resulting from that search in the arson trial.
II

In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), this Court imposed a warrant requirement on city housing and fire inspectors requiring them to obtain an administrative search warrant prior to entering a building to inspect for possible health
or fire code violations. To protect the privacy interests of
building owners from the unbridled discretion of municipal inspectors, the Court held that administrative searches had to
be conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained from an independent magistrate. Camara, 387 U. S., at 534. But in
light of the important public interest in abating public health
hazards, the relatively limited invasion of privacy inhering in
administrative searches, and the essentially non-criminal
focus of the inspection, a different kind of warrant was estab-
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lished, a warrant described by the dissenters in that case as
"newfangled." See, 387 U. S., at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Probable cause to issue this kind of warrant did not sound in
terms of suspicion of criminal activity, but in terms of reasonable legislative or administrative standards governing the decision to search a particular building. Id., at 538.
One may concede the correctness of the Camara-See line of
cases without agreeing that those cases should be applied to a
post-fire inspection conducted to determine the cause and origin of a fire. The practice of investigating the cause and origin of fires has long-standing and widespread acceptance.
~
The public interest in conducting a prompt and careful investigation of the cause and origin of all fires is also undeniably
·
~
strong. An investigation can reveal w~ether there is a dan-J ~~~
g r of the fire rekindlin and assess the ef£ chvenes onoc~\ ~· ,_
~
( buildin codes in pre entin .a.u,g_ 'miting_!he aQ_rea of e.
may bring to ight facts suggesting the crime of arson.
Entry is also necessary because the causes of a fire may also
~ ~
not be observable from outside a building or by an uninw ,~ c--J hh_
formed occupant. See United States v. Green, 474 F. 2d
~
1385, 1388-89 (CA5 1973). Certain! these reasons ·us · y a
~earch to determine the ca
origin of..aJire.
-._ ) Cl..f)
_
The concerns regarding administrative searches expressed
W
in Camara and See to justify the imposition of a warrant re~
quirement simply do not apply to a post-fire investigation
~,· {;..1_~-<.r (.,G~
conducted within a reasonable time of a fire. Under the
D
r
emergency doctrine, it is beyond dispute that fire fighters
~~...d~
may enter a building in order to extinguish the flames.
~~
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1976). In their efforts to control the blaze fire fighters may knock in doors and
windows, chop holes in roofs and walls, and generally take
full control of a structure to extinguish a fire. In the aftermath of a fire an individual is unlikely to have much concern
over the limited intrusion of a fire inspector coming into his
premises to learn why there had been a fire. Fire victims,
unlike occupants at ordinary times, generally expect and wel-
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come the intrusions of fire, police, and medical officials in the\ J.r~~period following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers ~
~=r::A..e..:\M
such as insurance agents will frequently have authority to
~-n-----"-enter the structure. In these circumstances, the intrusion of
the fire inspector is hardly a new or substantially different
intrusion from that which occurred when the fire fighters
~
first arrived to extinguish the flames. Instead, it is analogous to intrusions of medical officials and insurance investiga....-~<..tA- .z ~~
tors who may arrive at thascen~
e fire shortl after its -lv .e
origin.
Ample justification exists for a state or municipality to authorize a fire inspection program that would permit fire in- ~~~1 ~Cv"---'
spectors to enter premises to determine the cause and origin ..l-"1.-.~L
~~
of the fire. But in no real sense can the investigation of the ()...~ \....<)
Cliffords' home be considered the result of the unbridled dis- .f\..L1w--tcretion of the city fire investigators who came to the Cliffords' home. 1 No justification existed to inspect the Cliffords' home until there was a fire. The fire investigators
were not authorized to enter the Cliffords' home until the
happening of some fortuitous or exigent event over which
they had no control. Thus, if the warrant requirement exists to prevent individuals from being subjected to an unfettered power of government officials to initiate a search, a
warrant is simply not required in these circumstances to limit
the authority of a fire investigator, so long as his authority to
inspect is contingent upon the happening of an event over
1

This is made abundantly clear by the Detroit Fire Department's policy
regulating post-fire investigations. That policy encourages investigators
to conduct an investigation as promptly as possible. If the property is occupied or is a place of business trying to conduct business, inspectors are
instructed to obtain consent or an administrative warrant. If the
premises are occupied by children, inspectors must obtain consent from an
adult before entry. To inspect premises secured from trespass, investigators must obtain consent or an administrative warrant. Only if the owners
are away and the building open to trespass may fire investigators enter
without consent or a warrant. Joint Appendix, at 9a, 12a, 19a (testimony
of Lt. Beyer and Capt. Monroe).

82--357-DISSENT
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD

6

which he has no control. 2
In my view, the utility of requiring a magistrate to evalu-]
ate the grounds for a search following a fire is so limited that
the incidental protection of an individual's privacy interests
simply does not justify imposing a warrant requirement.
Here the inspection was conducted within a short time of
extinguishing of the flames, while the owners were away
from the premises, and before the premises had been fully secured from trespass. In these circumstances the search of
the basement to determine the cause and origin of the fire
was reasonable. 3

The Tyler majority stated that a major function of the warrant requirement was to provide a property owner with sufficient information to
reassure him of the legality of the entry. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S.
499, 508 (1976). The relationship of this informational function and the
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is not clear. Some
attempt at notice or proper identification should allay any reasonable fears
that the inspectors are impostors or lack authority to inspect for the origin
and cause of the fire.
3
There may be some justification for requiring the inspectors to notify
the building's owners of the inspection. Where, as here, the owners were
out of town, it does not appear unreasonable to have conducted the inspection without prior notice to the owners. Notice simply informs the building owners that the building will be entered by persons possessing authority to enter the building. Yet the failure to notify the Cliffords prior to
entry fails to advance in any significant way the purposes of the exclusionary rule. In point of fact, the fire investigators were told the Cliffords
were unavailable, that they had gone fishing. J.A., at 16a. Thus, in
these circumstances the failure to notify the Cliffords seems reasonabl;
e.. ;
The Cliffords can also be deemed to have received constructive notice, because their agents were on the scene, and a neighbor apparently ascertained the legitimacy of the inspectors' visit.
2

1
.,
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its ·evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m.
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer·did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. 'They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason'The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A

We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.
2
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Privacy expectations Will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test essentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fii-e officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
3
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only qn a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510.
5
Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect 1P ~ particular dwelling. See
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also ~mara v. Municipal Court,
387 U. S., at 538.

l
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
scope of their administrative search without first making a
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.

IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
6
The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant.
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each.
A

As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later

...,.
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to investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 589--90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There
may bel\depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expectations in commercial premises.
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
7

~

,,

I

82--357-0PINION
10

MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD

search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
9
In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6.
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give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its ·evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. . The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m.
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entcy and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A

We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
2

See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Privacy expectations Will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test essentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire nonnally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
3
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
eXIgency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view'' doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
46&-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-

-

'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Tyler, 436 U. S. , at 510.
5
Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
'slative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conductan inspection are satisfied with respect ,tg,..a particular dwelling. See
articularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also ~Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U. S. , at 538.

A
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
scope of their administrative search without first making a
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Althougp there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home' was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
6

The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant.
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each.
A

As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made lateV
/
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to investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of
J>ri'vacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There
V may b~epending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expectations i@commercial premises.
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
7
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search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
it presumably would have limited the scope of the ·proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
9
In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6.

82--357-0PINION
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD

11

give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the
arson investigators. ExClusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m.
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.

·" .~
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshal}, v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A

We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
2
See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.

..
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri. vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testessentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
3
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of• For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510.
5
Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S., at 538.
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
scope of their administrative search without first making a
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
6
The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant.
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each.
A
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later
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by different officers to investigate its origin. Second, the
privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Clif(
fords had acted-were significantly greater than those in the
fire-damaged furniture store, making the delay between the
fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances. We frequently have
noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private
residence. 7 These facts-the interim efforts to secure the
burned-out premises and the heightened privacy interests in
the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where
a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his firedamaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency. 8
So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There
may be, depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expectations in commercial premises.
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
7
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search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
9

In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6.
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give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

•

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord .
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m.
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreasonThe can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.
1
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at
504--508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
A

We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
' See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.

r
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri. vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testessentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.
3
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. Ifthe primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of4
For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510.
6
Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S., at 538.

I
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
scope of their administrative search without first making a
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
6
The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant.
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each.
A
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later
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by different officers to investigate its origin. Second, the
privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly greater than those in the
fire-damaged furniture store, making the delay between the
fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances. We frequently have
noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private
residence. 7 These facts-the interim efforts to secure the
burned-out premises and the heightened privacy interests in
the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where
a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his firedamaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency. 8
So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
'See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There
may be, depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expectations in commercial premises.
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
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search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand , may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6.
9
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give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

•

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord .
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
Because I continue to hold the views expressed in my separate opinions in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 512 (1978),
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 325 (1978),
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 577-578, 583
(1978), and Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 606-608
(1981), I am unable to join JUSTICE POWELL'S opinion. I do
agree with him, however, that the holding in Tyler supports
the judgment commanded by his opinion.
There is unanimity within the Court on three general propositions regarding the scope of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the owner of a fire-damaged building. No
one questions the right of the firefighters to make a forceful,
unannounced, nonconsensual, warrantless entry into a burning building. The reasonableness of such an entry is too
plain to require explanation. Nor is there any disagreement
concerning the firemen's right to remain on the premises, not
only until the fire has been extinguished and they are satisfied that there is no danger of rekindling, but also while they
continue to investigate the cause of the fire. We are also
unanimous in our opinion that after investigators have determined the cause of the fire and located the place it originated,
a search of other portions of the premises may be conducted
only pursuant to a warrant, issued upon probable cause that a
crime has been committed, and specifically describing the
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places to be searched and the items to be seized. The issues
that divide us in this case are (1) whether the entry by Lieutenant Beyer and his partner at 1:30 p.m. should be regarded
as a continuation of the original entry or a separate post-fire
search, and (2) whether a warrantless entry to make a postfire investigation into the cause of a fire without the owner's
consent is constitutional.
I

I agree with JUSTICE POWELL'S conclusion that Lieutenant
Beyer's entry at 1:30 p.m. was a post-fire search rather than
merely a continuation of an earlier valid entry, ante, at S--9,
and disagree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S position that our
decision in Tyler is indistinguishable in this regard, post, at
2-3. In Tyler the Court was willing to treat early morning
reentries by the same officers who had been on the premises
a few hours earlier 1 as a "continuation" of their earlier valid
investigation into the cause of the fire. 436 U. S., at 511.
The attempt to ascertain the cause of the fire was temporarily suspended in Tyler because visibility was severely hindered by darkness, steam, and smoke. Under these circumstances, the return of the same 2 investigators shortly after
daybreak to ascertain the cause of the fire was indeed "no
more than an actual continuation" of their earlier valid
search. Ibid. Unlike Tyler, in this case the challenged entry was made by officers who had not been on the premises at
the time of an earilerViillaSearch. Moreover, in contrast to
Tyler, an investigation of the fire's origin was not temporarily suspended on account of the conditions at the scene and
Fire Chief See entered with Assistant Chief Sommerville at 8 a.m. and
Detective Webb accompanied Sommerville at 9 a.m. See had been on the
the scene at 2 a.m. and Webb had arrived at 3:30a.m. See 436 U. S., at
501-502.
2
It is true that in Tyler Assistant Chief Sommerville first arrived on the
scene at 8 a.m., but presumably he did not observe anything that was not
also seen by Chief See or Detective Webb, both of whom had been on the
scene earlier.
1
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resumed at the first opportunity when the conditions hampering the investigation subsided. While the investigators
in this case waited for the work crew on the scene to pump
water out of the basement before making their entry, the delay in their arrival at the scene apparently had nothing to do
with the fact that water had collected in the basement.
While that fact might have justified a temporary suspension
of an investigative effort commenced by investigators at the
scene before the premises were abandoned by fire officials, in
this case it amounts to a post hoc justification without apparent basis in reality. In general, unless at least some of the
same personnel are involved in a return to the premises and
the temporary departure was justifiably and actually occasioned by the conditions at the premises, I would apply the
test expressed by JUSTICE WHITE for measuring the scope of
the emergency that justified the initial entry and search:
"[O]nce the fire has been extinguished and the firemen have
left the premises, the emergency is over." 436 U. S., at 516.
I would only add that the departure of the firemen should
also establish a presumption that the fire has been extinguished and that any danger of rekindling is thereafter too
slight to provide an independent justification for a second entry, a presumption that could only be rebutted by additional
information demonstrating a previously unknown or unrecognized danger of rekindling.
II

Presumably most post-fire searches are made with the consent of the property owner. Once consent is established,
such searches, of course, raise no Fourth Amendment issues. We therefore are concerned with the fire investigator's right to make an entry without the owner's consent, by
force if necessary. The problem, then, is to identify the constraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment on an officer's
authority to make such an entry.
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In this context, the Amendment might be construed in at
least four different ways. First, the Court might hold that
no warrantless search of premises in the aftermath of a fire is
reasonable and that no warrant may issue unless supported
by probable cause that a crime has been committed. Such a
holding could be supported by reference to the text of the two
clauses of the Fourth Amendment. 3 No member of the
Court, however, places such a strict construction on the
Amendment.
Second, the Court might hold that no warrantless search is
reasonable but allow post-fire searches conducted pursuant
to a warrant issued without a showing of probable cause.
Following Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, JUSTICE
POWELL takes this position. In my judgment that position is
at odds with the text of the Fourth Amendment and defeats
the purpose of the Warrant Clause, enabling a magistrate's
rubber stamp to make an otherwise unreasonable search
reasonable.
Third, the Court might hold that no warrant is ever required for a post-fire search. If the search is conducted
promptly and if its scope is limited to a determination of the
cause of the fire, it is reasonable with or without probable
cause to suspect arson. JusTICE REHNQUIST has persuasively outlined the basis for that position, 4 and has noted that
As I noted in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra,
"The first Clause states that the right to be free from unreasonable
searches 'shall not be violated'; 11 the second unequivocally prohibits the issuance of warrants except 'upon probable cause.' 21" 436 U. S., at 326.
8

"1 1 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... '
"21 '[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.' " 436 U. S., at 326.
' To the extent, however, that he relies on the danger of rekindling, I
believe his analysis is flawed. I would suppose that JusTICE POWELL
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in certain cases there "may be some justification for requiring
the inspectors to notify the building's owners of the inspection." Post, at 6, n. 3.
A fourth position-the one I believe the two clauses of the
Fourth Amendment command-would require the fire investigator to obtain a traditional criminal search warrant in
order to make an unannouncea entry, but would characterize
a warrantless entry as reasonable whenever the inspector
had either given the owner sufficient advance notice to enable him or an agent to be present, or had made a reasonable
effort to do so. 5
Unless fire investigators have probable cause to believe
the crime of arson has been committed, I believe that the
home owner is entitled to reasonable advance notice that officers are going to enter h.1s remises or t e purpose of asuch notice would give the
caus of e e.
owner a fair o ortunit to be present while the investigation
is conducted, virtual y eliminating e need for a potentially
confrontational forcible entry. Advance notice of the search
is the best safeguard of the owner's legitimate interests in
the privacy of his premises, allowing him to place certain possessions he would legitimately prefer strangers not to see out
would also dispense with a warrant requirement if that danger were
present. Surely I would. For analytical purposes, I believe we must assume that the post-fire investigation cannot be supported on an emergency
rationale but rather is justified by the general regulatory interest in preventing similar fires, including those set by arsonists.
5
By prohibiting the issuance of any warrant to make an unannounced,
nonconsensual entry into the home, unless there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, my reading of the Fourth Amendment
carries out the express purpose of the Warrant Clause. JUSTICE PowELL'S view that a so-called administrative warrant will suffice does not, I
submit, provide the protection contemplated by that clause. On the other
hand, because I am persuaded that a post-fire investigatory search is reasonable-even without either suspicion or probable cause--when advance
notice is given to the home owner, the purpose of the Reasonableness
Clause can be satisfied without obtaining an administrative warrant that is
nothing more than a rubber stamp.
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of sight, and permitting him to be present during the search
to assure that it does not exceed reasonable bounds. Moreover, the risk of unexplained harm or loss to the owner's personal effects would be minimized and the owner would have
an opportunity to respond to questions about the premises or
to volunteer relevant information that might assist the investigators. It is true, of course, that advance notice would increase somewhat the likelihood th~ uld
concea or es roy re evan ev ence, u it seems fair to assu e a
e criminal will diligently attempt to cover his
traces in all events. In any event, if probable cause to believe that the owner committed arson is lacking, and if the
justifications for a general policy of unannounced spot inspections that obtain in some regulatory contexts are also lacking,
a mere suspicion that an individual has engaged in criminal
activity is insufficient to justify the intrusion on an individual's privacy that an unannounced, potentially forceful entry
entails.
I would not attempt to define the character of the notice
that would be appropriate in all cases, but I do not believe
that a nonexigent, forceful, warrantless entry can be reasonable unless the investigator has made an effort to give the
owner sufficient notice to be present while the investigation
is made. Naturally, if the owner is given reasonable notice
and then attempts to interfere with the legitimate performance of the fire investigators' duties, appropriate sanctions
would be available.
If there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed, the issuance of a valid warrant by a neutral magistrate will enable the entry and subsequent search to be conducted in the same manner as any other investigation of suspected criminal conduct, without advance notice to the
property owner. In such a case, the intrusive nature of the
potentially forceful entry without prior notice is justified by
the demonstrated reasonable likelihood that the owner of the
property will conceal or destroy the object of the search if
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prior notice is provided. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U. 8., at 582 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
In this case, as JusTICE REHNQUIST has pointed out, post,
at 6, n. 3, an argument may be made that the notice requirement is inapplicable because the owners were out of town.
But no attempt whatever was made to provide them with notice, or even to prove that it would have been futile to do so.
The record does not foreclose the possibility that an effort to
advise them, possibly through the same party that notified
the representatives of the insurance company to board up the
building, might well have resulted in a request that a friend
or neighbor be present in the house while the search was carried out and thus might have avoided the plainly improper
search of the entire premises after the cause of the fire had
already been identified.
I therefore conclude that the search in this case was unreasonable in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because
the investigators failed to provide fair notice of the inspection
to the owners of the premises. Accordingly, I concur in the
Court's judgment.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion in which JUSTICES BRENNAN,
WHITE, and MARSHALL joined.
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent fire.
I

Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at
their private residence. At the preliminary examination
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. The court certified its eviden-
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tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed.
That court held that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler.
II

In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m.
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer,
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence.
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18.
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene.
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a
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boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day.
While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was
seized and marked as evidence. 1
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clifford residence and began their investigation into the cause of
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris,
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m.
All of this evidence was seized and marked.
After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine.
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent
1
The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival.
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circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant
requirement.
III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead,
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire.
We decline to do so.
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally reqq.ire warrants. 436 U. S., at
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors:
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the firedamaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.
See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the
warrantless search in this case.
2
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A

We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire.
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Privacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test essentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is]
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies,
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B

A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished."
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in•we do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus,
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time,
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries.

\.
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vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new
exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not
apply in such cases.

c

If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 6 To obtain such a warrant, fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
• For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510.
5
Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S., at 538.
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465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the
scope of their administrative search without first making a
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer.
The object of the search is important even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling,
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable
cause. 6
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined
above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal
6

The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circumstances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant.
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belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under
these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the upstairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each.
A

As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circumstances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to its second.
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as
the last flames were being doused, but could not be completed because of smoke and darkness. The search was resumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first,
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511.
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken
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steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later
by different officers to investigate its origin. Second, the
privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly greater than those in the
fire-damaged furniture store, making the delay between the
fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances. We frequently have
noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private
residence. 7 These facts-the interim efforts to secure the
burned-out premises and the heightened privacy interests in
the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where
a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his firedamaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency. 8
So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B

Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson.
See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 58~90 (1980); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There
may be, depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expectations in commercial premises.
8
This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard.
7
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Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to
the basement area. Although the investigators could have
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement
search. 9
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches.
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case,
In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters'
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson.
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6.
9
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it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's private residence.

v

The only pieces of physical evidence that have been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord.
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be
reversed.
It is so ordered.

